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 2695 
TORCHING ATHLETE RIGHTS: EXAMINING 
THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC 
COMMITTEE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Abstract: The United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC) is a 
uniquely situated nonprofit corporation. As a federally incorporated nonprofit 
corporation, the USOPC’s vast powers derive from an act of Congress. The 
USOPC possesses exclusive jurisdiction over Olympic and Paralympic represen-
tation within the United States, has the sole power to recognize National Govern-
ing Bodies (NGBs), which in turn control individual athletes within each sport, 
and must develop interest within the United States for physical activity. Despite 
this sweeping scope, there has been to date little accountability for the USOPC 
board of directors (USOPC Board). Fiduciary duties bind all nonprofit directors. 
When directors breach these fiduciary duties, law and public policy demand that 
directors be held responsible. This Note examines three recent decisions of the 
USOPC Board through a fiduciary duty lens: (1) amending its Bylaws to replace 
the American Arbitration Association with an arbitral organization of its choos-
ing; (2) altering its mission statement to narrow the definition of athletes it con-
siders itself responsible for; and (3) dispersing grants to NGBs based on a “re-
sults oriented resource allocation process.” This Note concludes not only that the 
USOPC Board breached its fiduciary duties to the United States, NGBs, and am-
ateur athletes, but also that the U.S. Attorney General should enforce these duties 
and swiftly move to hold the USOPC Board accountable. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1908, Ethelbert Talbot, the Bishop of Pennsylvania, provided the inspi-
ration for the Olympic Creed during a sermon in advance of the London 
Games: “The important thing in life is not the triumph, but the fight; the essen-
tial thing is not to have won, but to have fought well.”1 This guiding light 
tracks the purposes for which the United States Congress chartered the United 
States Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC), a federally incorporated 
                                                                                                                           
 1 The Olympic Motto, INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://www.olympic.org/the-olympic-motto 
[https://perma.cc/YLZ8-TB5F]. Ethelbert Talbot served as a bishop of Pennsylvania for the Episcopal 
Church from 1898 until his death in 1928. Ethelbert Talbot, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, https://episcopal
church.org/library/glossary/talbot-ethelbert [https://perma.cc/6W92-CEKZ]. Pierre de Coubertin, the 
founder of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), adopted Bishop Talbot’s phrase in 1908 as the 
Olympic motto. The Olympic Motto, supra; What Is the Olympic Creed?, INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, 
https://www.olympic.org/faq/olympic-rings-and-other-olympic-marks/what-is-the-olympic-creed 
[https://perma.cc/T8BQ-RXSS]. 
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nonprofit corporation.2 President Gerald Ford observed that the United States 
was falling behind the rest of the world both in its achievement at the top eche-
lons of sport, as well as in providing opportunities for younger athletes.3 To 
remedy these shortcomings, Congress passed the Ted Stevens Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act (the Ted Stevens Act), and enacted a vertical structure of 
governance entrusting the USOPC with protecting athlete rights and opportuni-
ties.4 The USOPC has sole jurisdiction over all matters related to the Olympics 
and Paralympics, and the unique authority to coordinate and fund United States 
representation in Olympic and Paralympic events.5 
Somewhere along the way, the Olympic Creed stopped guiding the 
USOPC; while the Olympic Creed emphasizes participating over winning, the 
USOPC focuses on “money and medals.”6 United States gymnasts cite this focus 
as one of a multitude of factors that led to the years long sexual abuse of hun-
dreds of gymnasts by United States of America Gymnastics (USA Gymnastics) 
team trainer Larry Nassar.7 The gymnasts brought sixteen separate claims 
against the USOPC and its board of directors arising from the systemic abuse.8 
Entertainment and Sports Network (ESPN) reported on February 22, 2020 
that USA Gymnastics proposed a structured system of payouts in a settlement 
offer to the gymnasts.9 ESPN reported that the settlement offered athletes 
abused by Nassar at elite competitions and training camps $1,250,707.10 In 
contrast, the settlement offered athletes abused by Nassar at other sanctioned 
events $508,670.11 The Washington Post reported that USA Gymnastics condi-
                                                                                                                           
 2 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (2018) (stating that the United States Olympic and Paralympic Commit-
tee (USOPC) is “a federally chartered corporation”); S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 2 (1978). 
 3 S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 3. 
 4 Id. at 4. 
 5 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503(3), 220505(c)(3). 
 6 See JAMES DOWDEN & JOAN MCPHEE, ROPES & GRAY, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVES-
TIGATION: THE CONSTELLATION OF FACTORS UNDERLYING LARRY NASSAR’S ABUSE OF ATHLETES 
144 (2018) (quoting unnamed executive as saying “‘money and medals’ were probably uttered at 
every staff meeting . . . with the effect of marginalizing other topics such as athlete programming”). 
 7 Complaint & Jury Demand at 17, Doe v. U.S. Olympic Comm., No. 1:19-cv-00737-KMT (D. 
Colo. July 9, 2019). 
 8 Id. at 104–31. These claims were: Title IX Violations, Sex Discrimination under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Violation of Bodily Integrity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Failure to 
Train and Supervise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, Violation of 
the Safe Sport Act under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Gross Negligence, Negligence, Vicarious Liability, Ex-
press/Implied Agency, Negligent Supervision, Negligent Failure to Warn or Protect, Negligent Failure 
to Train or Educate, Negligent Retention, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Fraud and 
Misrepresentation. Id. 
 9 USA Gymnastics’ Proposal to Sexual Assault Survivors Ranges from $83K to $1.25M, ESPN (Feb. 
22, 2020), https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/28757570/usa-gymnastics-proposal-sexual-assault-
survivors-ranges-83k-125m [https://perma.cc/G9XT-XKKX] [hereinafter Proposal to Survivors]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. Additionally, the settlement offered athletes Nassar harmed “at non-USA Gymnastics loca-
tions” $174,401 and “individuals with ‘derivative claims’” $82,550. Id. 
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tioned the settlement on a release of claims against former USOPC and USA 
Gymnastics officials.12 An attorney for some of the gymnasts noted with disdain 
that the offer releases USOPC defendants from claims without the USOPC itself 
paying anything, and without any discovery regarding the alleged role of the 
USOPC in the abuse.13 
Responding to the settlement offer, four-time Olympic gold medalist 
Simone Biles tweeted, “Shouldn’t people be held accountable?”14 To answer 
Biles’s tweet: yes.15 
This Note offers an alternative path to holding the USOPC board of direc-
tors (USOPC Board) accountable.16 The USOPC Board can escape tort liabil-
ity, but it cannot hide from its fiduciary duties.17 This Note provides a frame-
work for how athletes can ask the U.S. Attorney General to enforce the 
USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties.18 
This Note begins by closely examining the updated Bylaws of the 
USOPC.19 A comparison of the updated USOPC Bylaws with the Ted Stevens 
Act reveals numerous instances where the Bylaws materially diverge from the 
Ted Stevens Act.20 Therefore, this Note argues that the USOPC Board 
breached its fiduciary duties by adopting Bylaws in direct contradiction to the 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Liz Clarke, Simone Biles Blasts USA Gymnastics’ Settlement Proposal; Aly Raisman Assails 
‘Massive Cover Up,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/
02/29/simone-biles-aly-raisman-blast-usa-gymnastics-settlement-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/SBE4-
94LP]. 
 13 Proposal to Survivors, supra note 9. Entertainment and Sports Network (ESPN) quoted attorney 
Mick Grewal: “[The USOPC is] trying to get out of this without providing any information, without any 
transparency and without any accountability . . . . Their failure to provide adequate information is going 
to continue to further traumatize our clients.” Id. Additionally, The Washington Post quoted one of the 
defenses provided by United States of America Gymnastics (USA Gymnastics) in its settlement offer: 
“Most fundamentally, all of the abuse claims are subject to dismissal on the basis that the Debtor did not 
have a legal duty to the Claimant.” Sally Jenkins, Larry Nassar Victims Want Accountability. Olympic 
Officials Offered Cash and Veiled Threats, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/sports/olympics/larry-nassar-victims-want-accountability-usa-gymnastics-offered-cash-and-veiled-
threats/2020/03/03/41e14208-5da8-11ea-b014-4fafa866bb81_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZEU8-LSBD]. 
 14 Simone Biles (@Simone_Biles), TWITTER (Feb. 29, 2020, 9:38 AM), https://twitter.com/
Simone_Biles/status/1233763542978977793 [https://web.archive.org/web/20200229163938if_/https://
twitter.com/Simone_Biles/status/1233763542978977793]. 
 15 See infra notes 304–349 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 304–349 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Thomas L. Hazen & Lisa L. Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A 
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 349 (2012) 
(“Members of [nonprofit] governing boards are regarded as fiduciaries.”). 
 18 See infra notes 275–349 and accompanying text. 
 19 USOPC, 2020 BYLAWS § 3.1 (June 18, 2020), https://www.teamusa.org/Footer/Legal/
Governance-Documents.aspx [https://perma.cc/XC67-RHPJ] [hereinafter 2020 BYLAWS] (stating that 
the USOPC board of directors (USOPC Board) manages the USOPC’s “business and affairs”). This 
Note is current through the June 18, 2020 USOPC Bylaws. The June Bylaws themselves incorporate 
edits made to the January 1, 2020 Bylaws. See USOPC, 2020 BYLAWS (Jan. 1, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/VLE5-G82E]. 
 20 See infra notes 196–263 and accompanying text. 
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Ted Stevens Act.21 Research has not unearthed an action challenging the 
USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties, but this must change.22 
Part I of this Note first looks at the USOPC’s incorporating statute and 
updated Bylaws.23 Additionally, Part I examines the fiduciary duties of non-
profit directors generally, as well as various mechanisms for enforcing these 
duties.24 Part II discusses three actions that implicate the USOPC Board’s fidu-
ciary duties: (1) replacing “American Arbitration Association” with “an arbitral 
association” that the USPOC designates in dispute resolution provisions; (2) 
altering its mission statement to focus on “Team USA Athletes”; and (3) estab-
lishing the method of USOPC grant dispersal to various sports’ national gov-
erning bodies.25 Part III argues that the Department of Justice, represented by 
the U.S. Attorney General, is the proper party for enforcing the USOPC 
Board’s fiduciary duties, and the Attorney General should protect the public by 
enforcing the USOPC Board’s fiduciary obligations.26 
I. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this Note is to provide a mechanism for challenging the 
USOPC Board’s breaches of its fiduciary duties, which requires an initial un-
derstanding of several areas of law.27 Section A explains the characteristics of 
federally chartered corporations.28 Section B overviews the USOPC and its 
history, governance, and legal issues.29 Section C turns to the fiduciary duties 
of nonprofit directors.30 Finally, Section D outlines the mechanics of enforce-
ment proceedings involving nonprofit corporations.31 
A. Title 36 Corporations 
Title 36 of the United States Code provides federal charters for more than 
ninety organizations.32 These organizations fall into three groups: (1) Patriotic 
and National Observances and Ceremonies; (2) Patriotic and National Organi-
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 264–349 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 264–274 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 32–107 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 108–178 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 179–263 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 264–349 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 264–349 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 32–49 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 50–107 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 108–162 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 163–178 and accompanying text. 
 32 36 U.S.C. §§ 2101–300101. The 104th Congress officially ceased the practice of chartering due 
to potential confusion surrounding the relationship between the United States government and federal-
ly chartered corporations. Ronald C. Moe, Congressionally Chartered Corporate Organizations (Title 
36 Corporations), 46 FED. LAW. 35, 36 (1999). 
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zations, like the USOPC; and (3) Treaty Obligation Organizations.33 Title 36 
organizations are not government agencies, and each organization’s charter 
outlines its purposes, powers, and overall-governance structure, including 
membership.34 
Much of the legal scholarship concerning Title 36 organizations focuses 
on jurisdictional issues when the organizations sue or are sued.35 An organiza-
tion’s federally chartered status does not automatically admit it into federal 
court for dispute resolution.36 When a federally chartered organization’s ena-
bling statute expressly states that it has the capacity to be sued in federal court, 
however, federal question jurisdiction does exist.37 
                                                                                                                           
 33 36 U.S.C. §§ 2101–300101. The organizations chartered to facilitate observances and ceremo-
nies are the American Battle Monuments Commission, the United States Holocaust Memorial Muse-
um, and the President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities. Id. §§ 2101–2502. 
The bulk of Title 36 corporations are patriotic and national organizations, and include well known 
entities such as the USOPC, the American Legion, Big Brothers-Big Sisters of America, the Boy and 
Girl Scouts of the United States of America (separate organizations), and the Veterans’ Association. 
Id. §§ 20101–240112. The American National Red Cross (Red Cross) is the sole organization recog-
nized under the third category, Treaty Obligation Organizations. Id. §§ 300101–300113. Title 36 or-
ganizations are distinct from federally chartered “government business corporations” such as the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2018); Christina Maistrellis, American Nation-
al Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E.: An Open Door to the Federal Courts for Federally Chartered Corpora-
tions, 45 EMORY L.J. 771, 773 (1996). 
 34 See Maistrellis, supra note 33, at 774 (noting that it is the organization’s chartering statute that 
controls its liability); Moe, supra note 32, at 37 (stating that organizations are not “agencies of the 
United States”). The Supreme Court made clear in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States 
Olympic Committee (SFAA) that federally chartered corporations are private, not governmental, ac-
tors. 483 U.S. 522, 543 (1987). The Court noted the policy reasons for this classification, primarily an 
unpalatable liability expansion. Id. at 543 n.23. 
 35 See, e.g., Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 317, 330–37 (2009) (discussing the jurisdictional implications of being a federally 
incorporated nonprofit corporation). 
 36 Id. at 333. When a federal court has automatic jurisdiction over a case because of the type of 
claim asserted then there is “federal question jurisdiction.” See Federal-Question Jurisdiction, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The exercise of federal-court power over claims arising 
under the U.S. Constitution, an act of Congress, or a treaty.”). 
 37 Lund, supra note 35, at 334–35. The Supreme Court observed such language in American Na-
tional Red Cross v. S.G. 505 U.S. 247, 248 (1992). The Red Cross’s chartering statute provides that it 
can “sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.” 36 U.S.C. § 300105(a)(5). This differs from Little League Baseball, Inc., a federally chartered 
organization with only the power to “sue and be sued.” 36 U.S.C. § 130505(9). Where a corporation 
has capital stock, federal question jurisdiction exists if the United States owns a majority of the capital 
stock. Lund, supra note 35, at 334; see Capital Stock, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36 
(“The total number of shares of stock that a corporation may issue under its charter or articles of in-
corporation, including both common stock and preferred stock.”). Even if an organization does not 
have capital stock, if the United States solely owns that organization, federal question jurisdiction 
exists. See Jackson v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 462 F. Supp. 45, 50 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (holding that be-
cause the federally chartered Tennessee Valley Authority is a “wholly owned federal corporation,” 
federal courts possessed subject matter jurisdiction (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018)). 
2700 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2695 
Federally chartered organizations also complicate a second avenue into 
federal court: through diversity of citizenship.38 Although courts typically con-
sider corporations citizens of their states of incorporation or their principal 
place of business, federally chartered corporations do not neatly satisfy these 
requirements.39 A federally chartered nonprofit corporation can have either 
nationalized or localized citizenship.40 Diversity of citizenship cannot exist 
when a federally chartered nonprofit corporation has nationalized citizenship.41 
Therefore, to determine whether there is diversity of citizenship, courts ascer-
tain whether the federally chartered corporation is sufficiently “localized.”42 
The localized exception turns on whether a federally chartered corporation op-
erates in more than one state.43 This inquiry focuses on both the corporation’s 
actual actions as well as Congress’s intent.44 Additionally, Congress may ex-
pressly designate a federally incorporated nonprofit corporation as having state 
citizenship, even if it is otherwise national in character.45 
The government provides little oversight of federally incorporated corpo-
rations.46 Each organization must comply with audit requirements as dictated 
by its chartering statute.47 For example, the USOPC’s statute requires it to 
submit a report to Congress and the President every four years, and to make it 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Maistrellis, supra note 33, at 775. 
 39 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (stating that, for purposes of determining diversity, a corporation is a 
citizen of the state of its incorporation or “principal place of business”); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Tex. & 
Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 309–10 (1916) (finding no diversity of citizenship in part because the act 
of Congress incorporating Texas & Pacific Co. makes it a citizen of the United States, but not of Tex-
as); Maistrellis, supra note 33, at 775–76 (describing the relationship between federally chartered 
corporations and diversity of citizenship). 
 40 Lund, supra note 35, at 318–19. 
 41 Id. at 318. 
 42 See Burton v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 574 F. Supp. 517, 519 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (explaining the 
“localized” test for federally chartered corporations); Maistrellis, supra note 33, at 776 (same). 
 43 Lund, supra note 35, at 319. 
 44 See Burton, 574 F. Supp. at 521 (holding that the USOPC possessed national citizenship be-
cause of legislative history indicating Congress’s intention and the USOPC’s actual widespread multi-
state activities). Courts scrutinize “localized” assertions, and are careful not to let the localized excep-
tion swallow the general nationalized rule. See Maistrellis, supra note 33, at 776 (explaining the nar-
rowness and stringency of a “localized” finding). 
 45 See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (“All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other 
actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”); 
36 U.S.C. § 300101 (stating that “[t]he American National Red Cross is a . . . body corporate and 
politic in the District of Columbia”); Bankers Tr. Co., 241 U.S. at 310 (recognizing congressional 
power to grant federally chartered corporation’s state citizenship). 
 46 Moe, supra note 32, at 38. 36 U.S.C. § 10101 requires an annual audit of federally chartered 
organizations, unless Congress has laid out different requirements. 36 U.S.C. § 10101. In addition to 
financial statements, § 10101(b) details supplemental statements the organizations must compile in a 
non-public report, except for reports of organizations related to veterans, which are public. Id. 
§ 10101(b); 44 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018). 
 47 See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 220511 (laying out reporting requirements for the USOPC). 
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publicly available to individuals at a reasonable cost.48 By comparison, the 
Boy Scouts of America, another Title 36 corporation, must file an annual re-
port with Congress.49 
B. The United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee 
Congress incorporated the USOPC50 as a nonprofit corporation, and sub-
sequently amended the original charter with the adoption of the Ted Stevens 
Act, which this Section discusses in relevant detail.51 Subsection 1 of this Sec-
tion provides an overview of the congressional history of the Ted Stevens Act, 
paying special attention to the substantial amendments of 1978 and 1998.52 
Subsection 2 discusses the June 18, 2020 updated USOPC Bylaws, as well as 
disputes centered around the Bylaws.53 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. Until Congress amended the statute in 1998, the statute required the USOPC to file an an-
nual report. Compare id. (requiring, after June 2001, a report every four years), with 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220511 (1996) (requiring an annual report). See also 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.4 (providing 
that the USOPC will provide reports to Congress as required by the Ted Stevens Olympic and Ama-
teur Sports Act (the Ted Stevens Act)). 
 49 36 U.S.C. § 30908. Other federally chartered organizations that must file annual reports include 
the Disabled American Veterans (36 U.S.C. § 50308) and the American Legion (36 U.S.C. § 21708). 
36 U.S.C. §§ 21708, 50308. 
 50 The United States Olympic Committee is as of January 1, 2020 called the United States Olym-
pic and Paralympic Committee. 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19. The Ted Stevens Act has not been 
updated to reflect this change, but this Note will refer to the corporation as the USOPC. See 36 U.S.C. 
§§ 220501–220543; 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19. 
 51 See infra notes 52–107 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 54–82 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 83–107 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Ted Stevens Act and the USOPC54 
Congress incorporated what would become the USOPC in 1950, although 
its present structure dates to significant amendments in both 1978 and 1998.55 
The 1978 changes resulted from the passage of the Amateur Sports Act, a re-
sponse to President Gerald Ford’s desire to field a more competitive Olympic 
Team.56 The purpose of the amendment was to motivate U.S. citizens to pursue 
                                                                                                                           
 54 There is currently legislation engrossed in the Senate on August 4, 2020 and, as of September 
25, 2020, held at the desk of the House of Representatives amending the Ted Stevens Act. S. 2330, 
116th Cong. (2020) (as engrossed by Senate, Aug. 4, 2020); see S. 2330—Empowering Olympic, Par-
alympic, and Amateur Athletes Act of 2020, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (2019-2020), https://www.congress.
gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2330 [https://perma.cc/LZE2-ATEC] (providing status update for 
Senate Act 2330). The legislation makes a number of changes to the Ted Stevens Act, some of them 
pertinent to this Note’s discussion and analysis and also impacting the statute’s numbering in some 
instances. See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220543 
(the text of the Ted Stevens Act, as of Sept. 25, 2020, is available at https://perma.cc/C37D-JMAE). 
Most significantly for this Note, the proposed amendment to the Ted Stevens Act removes reference 
to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a). Compare id. § 220529(a) 
(explicitly referencing the AAA), with S. 2330 § 7(b), (e) (removing reference to the AAA). As of 
September 25, 2020 the Ted Stevens Act provides that “[a] party aggrieved by a determination of the 
corporation under section 220527 or 220528 of this title may obtain review by any regional office of 
the [AAA].” 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a). The proposed bill amendment would remove reference to the 
AAA, adopt language like that of the USOPC’s 2020 Bylaws, as well as give the aggrieved party the 
right to review by “the arbitration and mediation provider designated by the corporation under section 
220522(a)(4).” S. 2330 § 7(e). Similarly, the proposed legislation removes reference to the AAA in 36 
U.S.C. § 220522(a)(4)(B) and instead would provide for arbitration of certain decisions “in accord-
ance with the standard commercial arbitration rules of an established major national provider of arbi-
tration and mediation services based in the United States and designated by the corporation with the 
concurrence of the Athletes’ Advisory Council and the National Governing Bodies’ Council.” Id. 
§ 7(b). This Note’s discussion of the USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties and the AAA provisions in the 
USOPC Bylaws and the Ted Stevens Act consider the Ted Stevens Act as referencing the AAA. See 
infra notes 95, 99–101, 104–105, 196–236, 315–349 and accompanying text (discussing the AAA, the 
Ted Stevens Act, and the USOPC Bylaws). If this amendment passes, some of the statutory language 
this Note relies on will no longer exist. See S. 2330 § 7(b), (e). Nevertheless, four points remain true. 
First, as argued later in this Note, the USOPC Board still adopted the Bylaws in violation of their 
fiduciary duties because, at the time of adoption and since January 1, 2020, the approved Bylaws were 
contrary to law. See infra notes 196–236, 315–329 and accompanying text. Second, a federally char-
tered nonprofit corporation should not possess the power to change its Bylaws and then have Congress 
change the statutory language. See 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (identifying the USOPC as a federally char-
tered corporation, and by necessity identifying that Congress controls the USOPC, not the other way 
around). Third, as a policy matter and as later discussed, it makes little sense to remove the AAA as 
the forum for dispute resolution. See infra notes 315–329 and accompanying text. Fourth, this Note’s 
ultimate purpose—providing an avenue for holding the USOPC Board accountable for their actions 
through the U.S. Attorney General’s enforcement of the USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties—remains 
unaffected. See infra notes 275–349 and accompanying text. This Note will indicate other areas where 
the proposed legislation alters language in the Ted Stevens Act. 
 55 See U.S. Olympic Association Incorporation, ch. 975, 64 Stat. 899 (1950) (incorporating what 
was then called the U.S. Olympic Association); S. REP. NO. 105-325, at 1 (1998); S. REP. NO. 95-770, 
at 4–5. 
 56 S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 2–3. The Amateur Sports Act is also known as the Ted Stevens Act, 
after Senator Ted Stevens who served as a commissioner on the President’s Commission on Olympic 
Sports (PCOS). Id. at 2. To eradicate the unorganized and “factional disputes” that plagued competing 
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amateur athletics. The 1978 amendment empowered the USOPC to recognize 
and coordinate sports’ National Governing Bodies (NGBs).57 Each sport has an 
NGB that develops athletes within the sport, coordinates competitions, and 
works to increase participation.58 The Ted Stevens Act, by empowering the 
USOPC to recognize NGBs, allowed the USOPC to delegate much of the daily 
development and management of amateur athletes to such athletes’ NGBs.59 
The 1978 bill marked the first time athletes had a statutory right to participate 
in amateur athletic competitions, although more exhaustive substantive rights 
were compromised out of the bill and into the USOPC’s Bylaws.60 Finally, the 
1978 amendment put the USOPC in charge of resolving disputes about qualifi-
cation and competing in protected competitions between NGBs and, among 
other parties, amateur athletes.61 
The 1998 amendment sought to bring the Ted Stevens Act in line with the 
modern Olympic reality.62 It changed the official name of the Ted Stevens Act 
                                                                                                                           
organizations within the same sport, the PCOS recommended a hierarchical structuring of Olympic 
sports in the United States, with the USOPC acting as a “coordinating body” that both recognized—
and to a degree controlled—National Governing Bodies (NGBs) of different Olympic sports. See 
SFAA, 483 U.S. at 544 (describing inspiration for the Ted Stevens Act); S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 3 (re-
marking that the USOPC now had the power to set requirements NGBs must satisfy to be officially 
recognized); Dionne L. Koller, A Twenty-First-Century Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 20 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 1027, 1047 (2018). At the extreme, the 1978 amendment allowed the USOPC to 
“suspend” or “revoke” an NGB’s membership in the USOPC for non-compliance with USOPC stand-
ards. S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 8. An additional revision was the introduction of arbitration to resolve 
specified disputes when two bodies are competing for NGB status. Id. at 9. 
 57 S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 6 (empowering the USOPC to recognize NGBs). 
 58 Structure: National Governing Bodies, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://
www.teamusa.org/About-the-USOPC/Structure [https://perma.cc/PX76-TGAY] (explaining role of 
NGBs in the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic structure). The USOPC notes that there are thirty-seven 
NGBs for summer Olympic sports and eight for winter Olympic sports. Id. Each of these NGBs are 
“responsible for training, competition and development for their sports, as well as nominating ath-
letes” to Olympic and Paralympic teams. Id. 
 59 Koller, supra note 56, at 1049. The USOPC has the sole authority to recognize NGBs, which in 
turn manage amateur membership in their sport. H. R. REP. NO. 95-1627, at 11 (1978) (emphasizing 
the novelty of the USOPC possessing the sole power to recognize a sport’s NGB); S. REP. NO. 95-
770, at 3, 6. Additionally, the 1978 amendments identified women and handicapped athletes as need-
ing enhanced attention and protection by the USOPC and NGBs. S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 5. These 
enhanced powers sought to “bring order to the amateur sports community” to reach “mutual goals and 
priorities” of the USOPC and NGBs. Id. at 4. The PCOS also noted the important role the USOPC 
plays in “promot[ing] and encourag[ing] physical fitness and public participation in sports.” Id. at 4–5. 
The 1978 amendment also granted the USOPC $30 million to implement the changes, a one-time 
injection of federal government financial assistance. H. R. REP. NO. 95-1627, at 11. 
 60 S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 5–6; see 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 9 (“Athletes’ Rights”). 
 61 H. R. REP. NO. 95-1627, at 14. Subsequent amendments maintain the substance of this lan-
guage, and can now be found at 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8). 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8) (stating that a purpose 
of the USOPC is “to provide swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes, 
national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and protect the opportunity of any ama-
teur athlete . . . to participate in amateur athletic competition”). 
 62 S. REP. NO. 105-325, at 1. The Senate Report expressly noted four changes: (1) Olympic events 
now occur every two years instead of every four years; (2) professional athletes are now allowed to 
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to the “Olympic and Amateur Sports Act,” increased protections for an “ath-
letes’ right to compete,” improved the efficiency and effectiveness of USOPC 
involvement in dispute resolution, and more completely incorporated the Para-
lympics.63 The 1998 amendment introduced an Athlete Ombudsman to assist 
with dispute resolution, and required an Athletes’ Advisory Council to increase 
athlete representation in USOPC decisions.64 
Currently, the Ted Stevens Act is split into four subchapters: (1) Corpora-
tion; (2) National Governing Bodies; (3) Grant to Keep Young Athletes Safe; 
and (4) United States Center for Safe Sport.65 
The “Corporation,” the first subchapter, outlines the USOPC’s purposes, 
powers, dispute resolution functions, membership standards, and reporting re-
quirements, as well as grants the USOPC exclusive use of the word “Olym-
pic,” and a handful of other specified words.66 The USOPC has fifteen enu-
merated purposes, including general encouragement of athletics in the United 
States, obtaining the “most competent amateur representation possible in each 
event of the Olympic Games,” providing resolutions of disputes between ath-
letes and NGBs, and helping women in amateur athletics.67 The USOPC’s 
powers are divided between those stated in its Bylaws, general corporate pow-
ers, and powers related to amateur athletics and the Olympic Games.68 Its gen-
eral corporate powers include the capacity to litigate, with an express allow-
ance for removal to federal court in civil suits alleging claims involving the 
USOPC’s statutorily granted authority.69 The Ted Stevens Act also grants the 
                                                                                                                           
compete in Olympic events; (3) athletes have increased financial opportunity associated with sport; 
and (4) the Paralympics has increased in size. Id. at 2. 
 63 Id. This name change reflected the change in athlete status from allowing only amateur athletes 
to allowing professional athletes to compete. Id. 
 64 Koller, supra note 56, at 1051. The Athlete Ombudsman must aid all athlete members of NGBs 
on their rights and protections. 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 13. There is currently one Athlete 
Ombudsman and two assistant Athlete Ombudsmens. Athlete Ombuds, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC 
COMMITTEE, https://www.teamusa.org/Athlete-Ombudsman [https://perma.cc/WDH9-XFFM]. Addi-
tionally, the 1998 amendment changed the reporting requirements of the USOPC from an annual re-
port to a once-every-four-years report. 36 U.S.C. § 220511(a); S. REP. NO. 105-325, at 6. 
 65 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220543. 
 66 Id. §§ 220501–220512. 
 67 Id. § 220503. Despite these broad purposes, several articles and reports note the USOPC’s laser 
focus on Olympic medal success. See, e.g., DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 136 (quoting former 
USOPC chief executive officer (CEO) Scott Blackmun: “We are in the medal business.”); Koller 
supra note 56, at 1044 (suggesting that the USOPC in reality focuses solely on “producing winning 
Olympic teams”). The USOPC Board subcommittee hired Ropes & Gray LLP to investigate the abuse 
of USA gymnasts by former team doctor Larry Nassar. DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 12. The 
Ropes Report noted that the USOPC Board primarily considers whether an NGB has athletes winning 
medals when dividing money between NGBs. Id. at 144. It also quoted an unnamed USOPC executive 
remarking that “‘money and medals’ were probably uttered at every staff meeting . . . with the effect 
of marginalizing other topics such as athlete programming.” Id. 
 68 See 36 U.S.C. § 220505 (delineating the USOPC’s powers); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19. 
 69 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9). 
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USOPC authority to control athlete representation at the Olympics and Para-
lympics by way of NGB athlete nomination to those competitions.70 The char-
ter tasks the USOPC with resolving conflicts that originate with disputes con-
cerning “eligibility and participation” in the Olympics and Paralympics. 71 
The second subchapter addresses NGBs.72 For the USOPC to recognize 
an NGB as a sport’s governing body, an NGB must comply with fifteen explic-
it requirements.73 A central provision requires NGBs to “provide[] an equal 
opportunity to amateur athletes . . . to participate in amateur athletic competi-
tion, without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, or national 
origin . . . .”74 The second subchapter allows NGBs to manage most of the day-
to-day business of individual sports.75 The extent of the USOPC’s delegation 
of daily business to NGBs, and the amount of oversight the USOPC should 
provide over NGBs, is unclear.76 In any event, if NGB members believe an 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. § 220505(c)(3). Section 220505(c) additionally grants the USOPC the authority to identify 
an NGB for each individual sport. Id. § 220505(c)(4). 
 71 36 U.S.C. §§ 220505(c)(5), 220509(a). Accompanying its duty to resolve disputes, the USOPC 
must also provide an Athlete Ombudsman, free of cost, to all amateur athletes to explain the effects of 
the Ted Stevens Act and the USOPC’s Bylaws. Id. § 220509(b). Additionally, this subchapter ad-
dresses the issue of taking complete teams to Olympic Games in a section fittingly titled “Complete 
teams.” See id. § 220512 (stating that the USOPC has discretion to select less than a complete team 
for a protected competition, such as the Olympics, if an insufficient number of athletes have met qual-
ifying standards). If one applies the “negative-implication” canon, the statute’s explicit identification 
of times when it permits an unfilled roster (when not enough eligible athletes exist) suggests that at all 
other times (when enough eligible athletes exist), the USOPC must name a full roster of such eligible 
athletes. See id. (addressing complete teams); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (2012) (describing the “negative-implication” 
canon, wherein “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others”). At first blush this 
interpretation appears to be in tension with the District Court for the District of Columbia’s ruling in 
DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee that the Ted Stevens Act did not require the USOPC to 
name an Olympic Team for the 1980 Moscow Games. 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1189 (D.D.C. 1980). Con-
gress added the “complete teams” provision, however, in its 1998 amendment, after the DeFrantz 
ruling. See S. REP. NO. 105-325, at 7 (adding a complete teams provision in a 1998 amendment). Fur-
ther complicating the picture is USOPC Bylaw § 3.21, which requires a three-fourths majority of the 
USOPC Board to vote in favor of non-participation in the Olympics, among other events. 2020 BY-
LAWS, supra note 19, § 3.21. Harmonizing these seemingly conflicting provisions suggests that alt-
hough the USOPC can elect to send no athletes, when it does send a contingent, unless there are not 
enough eligible athletes, it must name a full team. See 36 U.S.C. § 220512 (addressing complete 
teams). In setting criteria for Olympic qualification, an NGB may not set more stringent standards for 
Olympic team eligibility than the governing international body for its sport. Id. § 220522(14). 
 72 36 U.S.C. §§ 220521–220530. 
 73 Id. § 220522(a)(1)–(15). 
 74 Id. § 220522(a)(8). 
 75 See id. §§ 220523–220524 (describing authority and duties of NGBs); Koller, supra note 56, at 
1049–50 (outlining different duties of NGBs in organizing their sports). The USOPC cited this delega-
tion as a defense when it faced accusations that it should have prevented child abuse within an NGB. 
Koller, supra note 56, at 1050. 
 76 DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 149–50. Ropes’s Report characterized the USOPC’s 
relationship with NGBs as a “service-oriented” relationship, in which the USOPC “provide[d] re-
sources without accompanying oversight.” Id. at 149. The USOPC’s acting CEO in 2018 reported 
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NGB is violating its statutory duty, the Ted Stevens Act provides an individual 
enforcement mechanism.77 
The final two subchapters, added in 2018, authorize the U.S. Attorney 
General to provide grants to organizations that seek to aid the USOPC and 
NGBs with preventing different forms of abuse and establish a United States 
Center for Safe Sport (the Center).78 The statute tasks the Center with aiding 
NGBs to implement practices protecting amateur athletes from abuse.79 
The Ted Stevens Act does not create a private right of action, and courts 
have not construed the Ted Stevens Act as providing what amounts to an “ath-
lete’s bill of rights.”80 Courts support this proposition by noting Congress’s 
decision to move a proposed section on athlete rights to the USOPC Bylaws.81 
                                                                                                                           
before Congress that she believed “the [USOPC] ‘did not exercise the authority that I think the act 
gives us.’” Id. at 150. Ropes’s Report attributes some of this confusion to the “vagueness of the Ted 
Stevens Act.” Id. 
 77 36 U.S.C. § 220527. Individual members of NGBs, or those eligible to belong to such NGBs, 
may file these complaints against NGBs after depleting all remedies within the NGB. Id. § 220527(b). 
The USOPC, if satisfied that the complainant exhausted all alternatives, holds a hearing. Id. 
§ 220527(c). If the USOPC finds that the NGB violated the statute, it provides the NGB 180 days to 
make necessary changes or it will derecognize the NGB. Id. § 220527(d)(2)(A). If the USOPC finds in 
favor of the NGB, then the complainant may seek arbitration. Id. § 220529. For further explanation of 
the arbitration of disputes arising within the Ted Stevens Act, see Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Da-
vis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 92–94 (2008). There is proposed legislation removing the exhaustion 
requirement from 36 U.S.C. § 220527. S. 2330 § 7(d). 
 78 36 U.S.C. §§ 220531, 220541–220543. For further discussion of these provisions, see Koller, 
supra note 56, at 1053–54. 
 79 36 U.S.C. § 220542(1). The addition “is to clarify that a central purpose of the [USOPC] is to 
promote a safe environment in sports that is free from abuse, including emotional, physical, and sexu-
al abuse, of any amateur athlete.” S. REP. NO. 115-443, at 1 (2018). Increased attention on widespread 
sexual abuse in NGBs “raise[d] serious concerns about the extent to which the [USOPC] perceives 
and is acting upon its obligation to protect the health and safety of athletes” and provided the impetus 
for the amendments. Id. at 2. 
 80 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1191–92. Athletes in DeFrantz argued that the USOPC violated 
their right to compete in the 1980 Olympic Games. Id. at 1190. The DeFrantz court rejected the con-
tention that athletes had any statutory right to compete in the Olympic Games, noting that it was up to 
the USOPC to decide whether to compete at all in the Olympics. Id. at 1191. Because the court ob-
served no right to compete, it reasoned that the Ted Stevens Act did not encompass an “implied pri-
vate cause of action.” Id. at 1192. According to Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, this result arises 
from the policy position “that there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for deter-
mining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the 
Olympic Games.” Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
 81 Michels, 741 F.2d at 158; see 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 9; Mitten & Davis, supra note 
77, at 94–95 (listing cases that found that the Ted Stevens Act created no “substantive athletic partici-
pation rights” enforceable by athletes via private action). Indeed, the 1998 amendment to the Ted 
Stevens Act confirms courts’ interpretations and provides that the statute does not “create a private 
right of action.” 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9). As a result, the Ted Stevens Act preempts claims that deal 
with qualification or eligibility for protected competitions, unless “extraordinary circumstances” arise. 
Lee v. U.S. Taekwondo Union, 331 F.2d 1252, 1256–58 (D. Haw. 2004) (citing Harding v. U.S. Fig-
ure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Or. 1994) (finding “extraordinary circumstances” 
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In line with the prohibition on private rights of action, an arbitrator decides the 
outcome of the vast majority of athlete grievances against NGBs and the 
USOPC.82 
2. USOPC Governance and Structure 
The USOPC’s Bylaws underwent significant changes in 2020.83 Its up-
dated mission statement provides that the USOPC’s mission “is to empower 
Team USA athletes to achieve sustained competitive excellence and well-
being.”84 By comparison, the prior mission statement aimed “[t]o support U.S. 
Olympic and Paralympic athletes in achieving sustained competitive excel-
lence while demonstrating the values of the Olympic movement, thereby in-
spiring all Americans.”85 
Section Three of the USOPC Bylaws details the powers and composition 
of, and voting for, the USOPC Board.86 The USOPC Board oversees the 
“business and affairs” of the USOPC.87 The USOPC Board currently consists 
of fourteen individuals, and its composition must include representatives from 
a number of different councils and committees.88 Board members do not re-
                                                                                                                           
where the plaintiff pursued internal remedies and U.S. Figure Skating violated its rules, which collec-
tively led to a “serious and irreparable injury”)). In Lee, the District Court for the District of Hawaii 
dismissed Lee’s claims because he failed to fully pursue available internal remedies. 331 F.2d at 1259. 
 82 See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text (outlining arbitration procedures). 
 83 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19. 
 84 Id. § 2.1. The mission statement includes supplementary “Core Principles,” such as to “pro-
mote and protect athletes’ rights, safety, and wellness,” and “set clear standards of organizational 
excellence and hold ourselves and all member organizations accountable,” while still respecting the 
“role of our member organizations.” Id. Section 2.3 of the USOPC Bylaws purport to annually review 
and prioritize the purposes of the USOPC. Id. § 2.3. In the past, the USOPC expressed frustration with 
its dual obligations to elite-level athletes and “grassroots sports development,” but the Ted Stevens 
Act encompasses both duties and does not indicate any prioritization of such duties. See 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220503(6) (establishing that one of the USOPC’s purposes is to “promote and encourage physical 
fitness and public participation in amateur athletic activities”); Koller, supra note 56, at 1052–53 
(chronicling the Senate hearing on the USOPC’s views and obligations concerning non-elite level 
athletes). 
 85 USOPC, 2019 BYLAWS § 2.1 (2019) [https://perma.cc/6EZ7-XNUE] [hereinafter 2019 BY-
LAWS]. 
 86 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 3. 
 87 Id. § 3.1. These activities include electing members of the USOPC Board, admitting, oversee-
ing, and removing NGBs as members of the USOPC, “hir[ing], fir[ing], evaluat[ing] and set[ting] the 
compensation for the CEO,” and “achiev[ing] as much transparency in the operation of the corpora-
tion as is reasonably achievable.” Id. § 3.1(d), (j). 
 88 Id. § 3.2. The USOPC Board consists of five independent directors selected by the USOPC 
Board from individuals the Nominating and Governance Committee suggests, three members elected 
by the USOPC’s National Governing Body Council, three members elected by the USOPC’s Athlete 
Advisory Committee, two members elected by the USOPC’s U.S. Olympians and Paralympians Asso-
ciation, the United States members of the IOC, the International Paralympic Committee governing 
board (ex officio as a result of their IOC membership), the chair of the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic 
Foundation, and the USOPC CEO, both as non-voting ex officio members. Id. The Bylaws lay out 
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ceive compensation by virtue of being a director.89 The Bylaws permit the 
USOPC Board to establish committees to aid in its functioning.90 
Section Eight of the Bylaws establishes the USOPC Board’s authority to 
recognize, as well as rescind recognition of, NGBs.91 To be a member of the 
USOPC as an “Olympic Sport Organization,” such organization must be an 
NGB.92 To satisfy membership requirements, NGBs must comply with the 
USOPC’s “NGB Certification Program.”93 This program mandates that an 
NGB announce “clear” qualification procedures for protected competitions 
approved by a committee within the NGB, as well as the USOPC.94 Addition-
                                                                                                                           
specific voting procedures for each category of director. Id. A board member may serve for a maxi-
mum of two, four-year terms unless a board member’s position is ex officio. Id. § 3.6.1. The 2020 
update establishes an amended board staggering provision. Id. § 3.6.2. Section Fourteen extrapolates 
on the duties, composition, voting, and other matters related to the Athlete’s Advisory Council, and 
Section Fifteen does the same for the National Governing Bodies Council. Id. §§ 14–15. 
 89 Id. § 3.18. 
 90 Id. § 5. The Bylaws expressly note, however, that the USOPC Board does not eliminate its 
liability by delegating tasks to a committee. Id. § 5.1. The committees include an “Athlete and NGB 
Engagement Committee” (Engagement Committee), an “Appointment and Composition” Committee, 
a “Compensation Committee,” an “Ethics Committee,” and a “Nominating and Governance Commit-
tee.” Id. § 5. Each of these committees has its own requirements, purposes, and procedures. Id. The 
Engagement Committee is responsible for aiding the USOPC Board’s supervision of “NGBs’ compli-
ance with the Act, [the] Bylaws, and agreements with the USOPC.” Id. § 5.3.3(b). 
 91 Id. § 8.1. The Bylaws recognize that other organizations, in addition to NGBs, may be eligible 
for membership, if they “take some active part” in Olympic sports. Id. § 8.2. 
 92 Id. § 8.3. There can only be one recognized “Olympic Sport Organization” per sport. Id. Para-
lympic Sport Organizations track the same membership requirements as “Olympic Sports Organiza-
tion[s].” See id. § 8.6 (detailing requirements for membership as a Paralympic Sport Organization). 
The USOPC Bylaws outline requirements for organizations that do not facilitate Olympic, Pan Amer-
ican, or Paralympic sports. Id. §§ 8.12–.13.  
 93 Id. § 8.7. The 2020 amendment made significant alterations to Section Eight of the Bylaws. 
Compare 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 8, with 2019 BYLAWS, supra note 85, § 8 (updating the 
Member Section of the Bylaws). An NGB must “fulfill all responsibilities as an NGB as set forth in 
the Act.” 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 8.7.1(a)(i). Twenty percent of an NGB’s board and/or 
committees must consist of athlete representatives. Id. §§ 8.8.1, 8.8.2 (defining who qualifies as an 
athlete representative and requiring fellow athletes to elect athlete representatives). 
 94 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 8.7.1(d)(ii). The 2020 Bylaws added the requirement that selection 
procedures be “clear,” but eliminated the requirement that the procedures “fairly select athletes” for 
Olympic Games. Compare id. (stating that NGB must establish “clear . . . selection procedures” ap-
proved by the USOPC), with 2019 BYLAWS, supra note 85, § 8.7(g) (requiring a written and fair se-
lection procedure). This provision often comes into play, along with Section Nine, in arbitrations 
concerning team selection. See, e.g., Keter v. U.S. Track & Field, Case No. 01-19-0002-0105, at 11–
12 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n July 2, 2019) (Mitten, Arb.) (finding that where U.S. Track and Field 
(USATF) relied on results outside the published time frame for considered results, USATF denied 
athletes a fair opportunity for team selection). Even before the 2020 “clear” addition, arbitrators often 
examined the use of ambiguous discretionary selection procedures. See Rivera v. USA Cycling, Inc., 
Case No. 01-16-0002-6302, ¶ 13 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n July 26, 2016) (Oliveau, Arb.) (stating that 
discretionary selection must stem from objective factors because “[c]learly defined criteria are neces-
sary to provide guidance to athletes”); Small v. USA Cycling, Inc., Case No. 01-16-0002-6766, ¶ 73 
(Am. Arbitration Ass’n July 26, 2016) (Oliveau, Arb.) (noting the “circular logic” in using medal 
winning capacity in U.S. Cycling, Inc. selection procedures); Marable v. USA Wrestling Ass’n, Case 
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ally, the NGB must commit to binding arbitration involving (1) its recognition 
as an NGB and (2) the opportunity of athletes, among other groups, “to partic-
ipate in amateur athletic competition” pursuant to the commercial rules of the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA).95 
The Bylaws provide express athlete rights in Section Nine.96 Section 9.1 
prohibits USOPC members from preventing or threatening to prevent an ath-
lete from participating in any protected event.97 The USOPC “will, by all rea-
sonable means, protect the opportunity of an amateur athlete to participate if 
selected (or to attempt to qualify for selection to participate) as an athlete rep-
resenting the United States in any” protected competition.98 If an athlete alleg-
es that an NGB failed to protect that athlete’s opportunity to participate, and 
the internal USOPC decision does not satisfy the claimant athlete, such athlete 
may bring the claim to arbitration.99 
                                                                                                                           
No. 01-15-0004-1998, ¶ 43 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n July 17, 2015) (Oliveau, Arb.) (finding that a 
qualification procedure failed to satisfy the Ted Stevens Act requirement of an “objective basis” in its 
“subjective criteria,” and that the U.S. Wrestling Committee “acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in using unknown subjective criteria to arrive at the Decision”). Although written before the 
2020 amendments, the arbitrator in West v. United States Bobsled & Skeleton Federation Inc. noted 
that the Section Eight requirement for promulgating (then) written and fair procedures (now clear 
procedures) was to “inject as much objectivity and accountability into the selection process as is con-
sistent with the promotion” of competitive success on the international stage. Case No. 01-19-0000-
4345, ¶ 10.5 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n Mar. 19, 2019) (Myler, Arb.). There is a proposed amendment 
changing the selection criteria requirements. S. 2330 § 7(b). The proposed language would require 
selection criteria be “fair,” “clearly articulated in writing and properly communicated to athletes in a 
timely manner,” and “consistently applied, using objective and subjective criteria appropriate to the 
applicable sport.” Id. 
 95 36 U.S.C. § 220522(4). In connection with this opportunity provision, the Ted Stevens Act 
provides that the USOPC may alter the rules of arbitration. Id. § 220522(a)(4)(B). The same qualifica-
tion does not exist for the other references the Ted Stevens Act makes for recourse to the AAA. See 
id. § 220529(a) (“A party aggrieved by a determination of the corporation under section 220527 or 
220528 of this title may obtain review by any regional office of the [AAA].”). 
 96 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 9.1. 
 97 Id. Section Nine goes on to detail the process by which an athlete files a complaint against an 
NGB for violating its Section Nine obligations. Id. §§ 9.2–.10. Once an athlete files a complaint satis-
fying the Section Nine requirements, the “corporation’s dispute resolution team” as well as the Athlete 
Ombudsman seek to find an informal resolution. Id. §§ 9.5–.6; see id. § 13 (outlining the responsibili-
ties, independence, and privileges of the Athlete Ombudsman). If the athlete disagrees with the infor-
mal resolution, the athlete may move to arbitration. Id. § 9.7. Because Section Nine complaints impact 
not only the moving athlete (generally, if not always, an initially unselected athlete), but also athletes 
who have been selected to a team, such selected athletes (“affected parties”) must be notified of Sec-
tion Nine proceedings. Id. § 9.8. 
 98 Id. § 9.1. 
 99 36 U.S.C. §§ 220527(d)(1), 220529(a); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 9.6. Arbitrators em-
ploy a de novo review of USOPC Bylaw Section Nine cases and engage in a fact-intensive review of 
selection procedures as applied to the case at hand. Komanski v. USA Cycling, Inc., Case No. 01-15-
0004-9907, ¶ 4.1 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n Nov. 15, 2015) (Benz, Arb.). Arbitrators acknowledge, how-
ever, the superior knowledge of NGBs in making USOPC compliant selection decisions and therefore 
“generally [are] deferential to an NGB’s professional judgment.” Liu v. USA Table Tennis Ass’n, 
Case No. 01-19-0001-4377, at 17 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n June 20, 2019) (Mitten, Arb.). Arbitrators 
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The 2020 Bylaws no longer reference the AAA and now purport to allow 
the USOPC to select an arbitration association.100 The Ted Stevens Act, how-
ever, still unequivocally states that a party unsatisfied with a USOPC determi-
nation may seek review by the AAA.101 At arbitration, the athlete bears the 
burden of proving that an NGB failed to comply with its Section Nine obliga-
tions.102 As summarized in a 2012 arbitration, an athlete successfully bringing 
a Section Nine complaint must prove that an NGB “breached its approved and 
published Athlete Selection Procedures[,] . . . applied them inconsistently to 
athletes similarly situated, acted in bad faith towards or with bias against [an 
athlete], and/or violated applicable federal or state laws (e.g., Ted Stevens 
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act).”103 
Section Ten empowers members of NGBs to report potential NGB com-
pliance issues to the USOPC and request an investigation.104 Section Eleven 
                                                                                                                           
will not substitute their judgement for that of an NGB in determining the best selection procedure, and 
will only objectively determine whether such procedures, as approved and enacted, comply with the 
Bylaws and the Ted Stevens Act. Yun v. USA Taekwondo, Inc., Case No. 01-15-0005-7406, ¶ 89 
(Am. Arbitration Ass’n Jan. 7, 2016) (Oliveau, Arb.). Arbitrators will award attorney and filing fees 
against an NGB, even if they find for the NGB, where qualification requirements contravene the Ted 
Stevens Act. See Carr v. U.S. Speedskating, Case No. 77-190-E-00075-13-JENF, ¶¶ 37, 48 (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n Mar. 27, 2013) (Oliveau, Arb.) (finding for the NGB because all parties were equal-
ly affected by the insufficiently clear qualifying criteria but awarding athletes fees because U.S. 
Speedskating “failed in its duty under the [Ted Stevens] Act and as such must be responsible for the 
consequences”). 
 100 Compare 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22, with 2019 BYLAWS, supra note 
85, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (replacing AAA with “arbitral organization designated by the Board”). 
 101 36 U.S.C. § 220529 (stating that “[a] party aggrieved by a determination of the corporation 
under section 220527 or 220528 of this title may obtain review by any regional office of the [AAA]”). 
Section 220522 requires NGBs to agree to arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the 
AAA, if a controversy arises involving “the opportunity of any amateur athlete . . . to participate in 
amateur athletic competition.” Id. § 220522(a)(4)(B). Section 220527 provides that individuals may 
bring complaints against NGBs when they feel the NGB has violated § 220522, which lists out an 
NGB’s “Eligibility Requirements” among other sections. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220522, 220527(a)(1). 
 102 West, Case No. 01-19-0000-4345, ¶ 4.2. Although the athlete bears the burden of proving non-
compliance, when qualifying language remains ambiguous, such ambiguity “must be construed 
against the drafter,” generally an NGB. Id. ¶ 10.13; Lea v. USA Cycling, Inc., Case No. 0116-0000-
8307, ¶¶ 7.4–.8 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n Apr. 15, 2016) (Myler, Arb.) (finding, in a dispute over quali-
fication for the 2016 Olympic Cycling Team, “nomination” to be an ambiguous term, and stating that 
USA Cycling, Inc. should have nominated the athlete to the Olympic Team); see also Old Blue Rugby 
v. USA Rugby, Case No. 01-14-0000-4003, ¶¶ 38, 40 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n May 29, 2014) 
(Oliveau, Arb.) (finding that when regulations are unambiguous, the drafting party must interpret such 
regulations on a “rational” and “reasonable basis,” and not “act[] capriciously based on assumed 
facts”). 
 103 Tibbs v. U.S. Paralympics, Case No. 71-190-E-00406-12-JENF, at 14 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 
Aug. 28, 2012) (Mitten, Arb.). 
 104 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 10. The remainder of Section Ten outlines the specifics of 
complaint requirements, as well as the internal process for resolution. Id. As supra note 100 describes, 
the amended Bylaws purportedly allow the USOPC Board to pick the arbitral organization that an 
unsatisfied complainant may turn to. Id. § 10.21. Section 220529 of the Ted Stevens Act allows the 
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outlines how an amateur sports organization can apply to displace an NGB.105 
In Section Twelve, the USOPC requires its Board to comply with a Code of 
Conduct for itself, its member organizations, its chief executive officer (CEO), 
and all associated employees.106 Section Seventeen outlines the USOPC’s in-
demnification policies.107 
C. Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors 
This Section surveys the current law on the fiduciary duties of nonprofit 
corporation directors.108 In particular, this Note reviews a nonprofit director’s 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.109 
Directors of nonprofit corporations, like their for-profit counterparts, owe 
fiduciary duties.110 The two differ, however, in to whom each owes fiduciary 
duties.111 For-profit corporation directors owe fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion and by extension its stockholders, whereas nonprofit corporation directors 
owe duties to the nonprofit corporation, its members, or its purpose, as indicat-
ed in its incorporating documents or statute.112 To whom (or what) nonprofit 
                                                                                                                           
USOPC to establish complaint procedures, as well as permits any party dissatisfied by the outcome of 
the USOPC’s determination recourse to the AAA. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220527, 220529. 
 105 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 11. Replacing an existing NGB requires the proponent to 
demonstrate at a hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the existing NGB does not meet the 
Ted Stevens Act’s and USOPC Bylaw’s criteria for NGB recognition, as well as demonstrate that the 
proponent “more adequately meet[s] the criteria” of the Ted Stevens Act. Id. § 11.18. Like Section 
Ten, supra note 104, the USOPC’s amended Bylaws purport to allow the USOPC to pick the arbitral 
organization, whereas the Ted Stevens Act grants the unsatisfied party recourse to the AAA. 36 
U.S.C. §§ 220528, 220529(a); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 11.22. 
 106 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 12.1; U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., CODE OF CONDUCT POL’Y § IV 
(2018) (requiring all those affected to follow the Ted Stevens Act). 
 107 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 17. 
 108 See infra notes 110–162 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 120–162 and accompanying text. 
 110 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 349; Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Du-
ties: Defining the Duties of Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit 
Health Care Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 983 (2001). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “fiduci-
ary” as “[s]omeone who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the 
scope of their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, loyalty, due care, and 
disclosure.” Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36. Since Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes 
National Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, nonprofit directors have been held to the 
lower corporate law standard of gross negligence, as opposed to the more stringent trustee standard of 
negligence. 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fiduciary Principles in 
Charites and Other Nonprofits, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, 103, 115 (Evan J. 
Criddle et. al. eds., 2019). 
 111 See infra note 112 and accompanying text (contrasting for-profit and nonprofit beneficiaries of 
fiduciary duties). The question of to whom fiduciaries owe duties presented itself in Securities & 
Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., when Justice Frankfurter observed that “to say that a man is 
a fiduciary only begins analysis . . . . To whom is he a fiduciary?” 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943). 
 112 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (clarifying that the Model 
Business Corporation Act’s “standards of conduct for [corporate] directors” should be interpreted as 
“analogous to those generally articulated by courts in evaluating director conduct, often referred to as 
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directors owe fiduciary duties depends on the organization’s governance struc-
ture and incorporating language.113 Parsing out the beneficiary of the director’s 
fiduciary acts does not matter if the result of pursuing the nonprofit’s purpose 
is the same as pursuing the nonprofit’s interests.114 
Each state’s nonprofit laws define the scope of nonprofit directors’ fiduci-
ary duties.115 Nonprofit fiduciary duties often track their for-profit counter-
parts, and this Note will discuss and rely on both established for-profit and 
nonprofit duties in assessing director duties within the federally chartered non-
profit corporation arena.116 
Limited instances of court enforcement of nonprofit director’s fiduciary du-
ties exist, and research has not yet uncovered cases involving the enforcement of 
fiduciary duties of directors of federally incorporated nonprofit corporations.117 
This limited enforcement stems from several factors, including heightened set-
tlement motivations in the nonprofit context, lack of specific state nonprofit law, 
and restricted standing to sue.118 Subsection 1 addresses the fiduciary duty of 
care, Subsection 2 the duty of loyalty, and Subsection 3 the duty of obedience.119 
                                                                                                                           
the duties of care and loyalty”); Mayer, supra note 110, at 105 (noting that a nonprofit’s governance 
structure dictates to whom the directors owe fiduciary duties). 
 113 Mayer, supra note 110, at 105. 
 114 Id. at 108. 
 115 See Douglas A. Berman, Developments in the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1578, 1581–82 (1992) (observing that states take different approaches to organizing nonprofit 
law). The American Bar Association also puts out a Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (Model Act). 
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). The push towards formalizing and clarifying 
nonprofit law is relatively new, especially as compared to nonprofit’s for-profit counterparts. Hazen & 
Hazen, supra note 17, at 351. 
 116 See Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance 
Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 703–04, 713 
(2008) (stating that nonprofit and for-profit governance obligations “essentially” track one another). 
Because of the voluntary nature of nonprofit directors, there is some pushback to holding such direc-
tors to the same standards as their for-profit counterparts. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 378 
(recognizing complicating factor of voluntarism in holding nonprofit directors liable for mismanage-
ment). Furthermore, not all scholars believe corporate law transfers neatly onto nonprofit law. See, 
e.g., Linda Sugin, Strengthening Charity Law: Replacing Media Oversight with Advance Rulings for 
Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 89 TUL. L. REV. 869, 880 (2015) [hereinafter Sugin, Strengthening Charity 
Law] (observing that the effectiveness of “self-enforcement” in corporate law stems from market 
dynamics, and questioning whether “self-enforcement” in the nonprofit sector can police nonprofit 
directors given the absence of consumer influence). 
 117 See Sugin, Strengthening Charity Law, supra note 116, at 871–72 n.6 (stating that, as of 2015, 
research uncovered only ten instances of courts concluding that nonprofit directors breached their 
fiduciary obligations and awarding remedies). 
 118 See id. at 873, 876, 879. 
 119 See infra notes 120–162 and accompanying text. 
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1. Duty of Care 
Directors owe a duty of care to act as someone in their position reasona-
bly would in a similar situation.120 The duty of care focuses more on the direc-
tor’s decision-making process, and less on the actual substance of that deci-
sion.121 Accordingly, where directors make decisions unpalatable in hindsight, 
liability exists only if, in coming to that decision, the director acted with gross 
negligence.122 The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (Model Act) and case law 
include in a director’s duty of care the duty to oversee the corporation’s func-
tionings.123 Directors may violate this duty when they do not provide sufficient 
oversight of the nonprofit corporation’s functionings.124 
As a default, the Model Act protects directors from monetary liability for 
a breach of their duty of care.125 Accordingly, courts often dismiss claims 
where plaintiffs assert only that directors breached their duty of care and seek 
money damages.126 
2. Duty of Loyalty 
Famously articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Meinhard v. 
Salmon, the duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to act with “the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive.”127 In both the for-profit and nonprofit contexts, this 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 356; see MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (estab-
lishing a standard of conduct of care for nonprofit directors). 
 121 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 380–81. 
 122 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d, 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 123 In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 338 B.R. 548, 569 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); see MODEL NON-
PROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (referencing the board’s “oversight function” in the section establishing 
the standard of care). 
 124 See In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 629–30 (3d Cir. 2015) (observing 
sufficient support for affirming a jury verdict that nonprofit directors of nursing home breached their 
duty of care, when directors were “responsible for the oversight of the nursing home administrator”). 
In In re Lemington, a nonprofit board of directors employed an administrator who repeatedly failed to 
remedy health violations in the nursing home, and contrary to the law, allowed her to continue in her 
role as administrator after her firing. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upon review of the 
board’s acts, concluded that the directors breached their duty of care. Id.; see MODEL NONPROFIT 
CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iv) (ascribing liability to directors for “sustained failure . . . to devote atten-
tion to ongoing oversight of the activities and affairs of the corporation”). 
 125 See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(d) (removing monetary liability for breaches of 
duty, except for liability associated with retention of an improper benefit, an “intentional infliction of 
harm,” unlawful distributions, and knowing violations of criminal law). 
 126 See Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 752 (recognizing that when corporations have a provision in 
their articles of incorporation exculpating directors for violations of their duty of care, and plaintiffs 
seek only monetary damages, such a provision works as an “affirmative defense”); Eric C. Chaffee & 
Karie Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Honoring the Fiduciary Duties Owed to the 
Corporation and Its Stockholders, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1443 (2017) (observing the limited value of 
a duty of care because of exculpation provisions in articles of incorporation). 
 127 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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requires directors to act in the best interests of the corporation.128 Boards can 
breach their duties of loyalty in numerous ways, with the paradigmatic exam-
ple being a transaction where board members find (or place) themselves on 
both sides of the transaction.129 The duty of loyalty encompasses the duty of 
good faith, expanding its reach beyond strictly financial transactions.130 This 
Subsection will focus on two ways directors can breach their duty of loyalty 
not involving financial self-dealing transactions: (1) a breach of the board’s 
duty of oversight, and (2) a breach due to violation of the law.131 
A board violates its duty of loyalty by failing to implement measures to 
monitor a corporation’s compliance with relevant laws.132 A court may find a 
breach where the board either (1) failed to implement any reporting system, or 
(2) failed to oversee an implemented reporting system.133 Courts rarely find 
facts sufficient to support a plaintiff’s claim that the board breached its duty of 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (requiring directors to act “in good faith” and 
“in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the nonprofit corporation”); 
Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 349 (describing the duty of loyalty). 
 129 See In re Capital One Derivative S’holder Litig., 952 F. Supp. 2d 770, 784 (E.D. Va. 2013) 
(acknowledging that conflicts of interest often sit at the center of loyalty claims); Hazen & Hazen, 
supra note 17, at 380–81 (recognizing the duty of loyalty’s focus on “substance” over process). The 
duty of loyalty also prohibits directors from taking corporate opportunities, withholding material in-
formation, or aiding others in harming the corporation. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 381–82. 
Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. describes the for-profit corporation duty of 
loyalty as focusing on director action with respect to the corporation’s long-term success, and con-
trasts this with the nonprofit corporation duty of loyalty, which focuses on pursuing the nonprofit’s 
charitable mission. 112 S.W.3d 486, 503–04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see also Harvey J. Goldschmid, 
The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Re-
forms, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 631, 641–42 (1997) (describing a similar difference in regards to the duty 
of care). 
 130 Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 811 F.3d 22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting 
that Virginia law obligates nonprofit directors to act loyally, which includes acting in good faith); 
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases 
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases 
where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”). 
 131 See infra notes 132–142 and accompanying text. 
 132 Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (stating that a board acts in bad faith and 
breaches its duty of loyalty when there is an “utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable infor-
mation and reporting system exists” (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 133 Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 971–72. The Delaware Court of Chancery articulated the Caremark 
standard after finding that the board of directors of Caremark International, Inc. had not knowingly 
violated the law. Id. at 971. The court moved past the knowing violation of the law because evidence 
indicated that the board of directors was “to some extent unaware of the activities that led to liability.” 
Id. In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard in Stone v. Ritter and clarified the 
culpability requirement that “directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obliga-
tions.” See 911 A.2d at 370 (clarifying, too, that Caremark claims arise from directors acting in bad 
faith and therefore, these claims are a subsidiary of the duty of loyalty). Although Delaware courts set 
a high standard for Caremark clams, the two recently successful claims discussed infra note 135 
demonstrate its continued recognition. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedi-
ence, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2025 (2019) (noting the “potential validity” of Caremark claims). 
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loyalty by failing to implement reporting systems or monitor such systems, a 
commonly called Caremark claim; however, in 2019 two plaintiffs successful-
ly pled them.134 In 2019, in Marchand v. Barnhilll, the Delaware Supreme 
Court concluded that the Bluebell Creameries board of directors did not exe-
cute any oversight system for food safety as required by Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Regulations.135 In 2019, in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative 
Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that the board of direc-
tors failed the second prong of Caremark by not acting when it had knowledge 
that its drug testing did not comply with FDA regulations.136 Essential to the 
claims in Clovis and Marchand was the board of directors’ “conscious[] disre-
gard[]” for “red flags” indicating regulatory noncompliance.137 
A board also breaches its duty of loyalty when it engages in conduct vio-
lative of law.138 When directors pursue illegal acts, courts find those acts fa-
cially ultra vires, or “beyond the powers of” fiduciaries, and as such violative 
of the director’s duty of loyalty.139 Importantly, directors do need to act in sub-
jective bad faith to breach this duty.140 For example, in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s 2011 opinion, In re Massey Energy Co., the court held that a direc-
tor violated his duty of loyalty when he consciously caused the corporation to 
obtain a profit through illegal actions.141 Unlike in the duty of care context, 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See Gubricky v. Ells, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1130–31 (D. Colo. 2017) (differentiating between 
a well-pled oversight claim and an ill-advised, but nonculpable, business decision); Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 971 (defending the high standard of oversight claims because of a benefit received by share-
holders due to a standard encouraging more “qualified” board member participation); infra notes 135–
137 and accompanying text (discussing two successfully pled Caremark claims in 2019). 
 135 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 808–09. 
 136 No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 
 137 In re Chemed Corp., S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 13-1854-LPS-CJB, 2019 WL 3215852, at 
*24 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2019). Chemed noted that repeated lawsuits against a corporation can amount to 
“red flags,” although the inquiry then turns to whether directors consciously disregarded those flags. 
Id. at *19. 
 138 See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that “one cannot act 
loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to 
obey”). The Delaware Court of Chancery distinguishes in Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retire-
ment System v. Corbat a board of directors enabling illegal actions from a board of directors’ failure of 
oversight. No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017). 
 139 See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34; Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36 
(“Unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or bylaw . . . .”). 
 140 See Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Gen. Term 1909) (concluding that an amusement 
park director violated his fiduciary duty when he sought to benefit the park by bribing potential com-
plainants about illegal Sunday operations). 
 141 No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011). Courts do, however, 
require violations of law to be knowing. See, e.g., Capital One, 952 F. Supp. at 784 (requiring plain-
tiffs to prove that directors “knowingly, consciously, or in bad faith allowed the Bank to break the 
law”). 
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nonprofit corporations may not limit the liability directors face for breaches of 
their duty of loyalty.142 
3. Duty of Obedience 
The duty of obedience obligates a director to make the corporation act in 
accordance with its purpose.143 The duty of obedience plays an important role 
in the nonprofit sector, in which a corporation’s purposes are typically more 
limited and defined than in its for-profit cousin.144 The duty of obedience un-
derlies the duty of care and good faith requirements that directors may not vio-
late legal norms.145 Described as the “stepchild in the law of fiduciary duties,” 
it often arises alongside, or is entirely subsumed by, duty of loyalty or care vio-
lations.146 Nevertheless, some scholars and courts approvingly argue that non-
profit law recognizes a duty of obedience distinct from the duties of care and 
loyalty.147 The norms fall into two categories: (1) “legal norms,” which prohib-
it illegal acts, and (2) “charter fidelity norms,” which require a board to act 
within its corporate purposes.148 
For example, in 2005, plaintiffs in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. New 
York argued that the board of directors of Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
(Empire) violated its duty of obedience when it sought to transform Empire 
from a nonprofit corporation into a for-profit one.149 The Court of Appeals of 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See, e.g., F.D.I.C. ex rel. Co-op. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir. 2015) (prohibiting 
a North Carolina corporation from limiting duties of loyalty and good faith); MODEL NONPROFIT 
CORP. ACT § 8.31 (a)(2) (permitting director liability for acts constituting a breach of such director’s 
duty of loyalty). 
 143 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Hays, No. SA-92-CA-0653, 1993 WL 302150, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 
29, 1993) (locating a duty of obedience in an obligation of a director to not act ultra vires); see James 
J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 237 (2003) (stating that a 
“director must follow the purposes and powers expressed in the governing legal documents” because 
of the duty of obedience); Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 386 (noting the heightened importance of 
the duty of obedience in the nonprofit sector). 
 144 Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary 
Duties in the Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 309 (2016). 
 145 Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 461 
(2010). Both Caremark claims and the duty of obedience stem from a recognition of unassailable 
corporate norms. Id. 
 146 Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedi-
ence into Fidelity Symposium: Nonprofit Law, Economic Challenges, and the Future of Charities: 
Panel IV: The Increasing Resemblance of Nonprofit and Business Organizations Law, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 893, 900–01 (2007) [hereinafter Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization]; see Rob Atkinson, 
Obedience as the Foundation Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 54 (2008) (placing the duty of obe-
dience at “the root of any fiduciary relationship”). 
 147 See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 145, at 458. 
 148 Johnny R. Buckles, How Deep Are the Springs of Obedience Norms That Bind the Overseers 
of Charities? 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 913, 932–33 (2013). The Model Act contemplates lawsuits brought 
derivatively against boards for ultra vires actions. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04. 
 149 840 N.E.2d 68, 88 (N.Y. 2005). 
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New York at least recognized that such a duty existed but concluded that the 
Empire board of directors had not violated it.150 Additionally, in 1999, in In re 
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital v. Spitzer, the Supreme Court of New 
York found the duty of obedience’s guidance essential to determining whether 
a nonprofit board of directors’ sale of assets furthered that nonprofit’s pur-
pose.151 If a nonprofit wishes to act outside of its incorporated purpose, such 
nonprofit may amend its articles of incorporation.152 
Although the duty of obedience does not enjoy as wide-spread recogni-
tion as the duties of care and loyalty, some have argued for its resurgence.153 
The duty of obedience stemmed from the for-profit corporation ultra vires doc-
trine, which required corporations to act within their charter’s purposes.154 The 
ultra vires doctrine went out of style, yet has increasingly come back into fash-
ion in a modern form, bringing with it (although not explicitly) the duty of 
obedience.155 This is even more pronounced in the nonprofit context, in which 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. The majority concluded that the board of directors’ interpretation of the nonprofit’s mis-
sion was “reasonable” and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 88. The dissent, however, 
noted that the “fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience . . . are far too important to be super-
seded by statute without adequate justification or explanation.” Id. at 89 (Smith, J. dissenting). In his 
dissent, Judge Smith noted that the New York Attorney General recognizes the duties of care, loyalty, 
and obedience. Id. at 94 n.16. Pennsylvania also recognizes a duty of obedience for nonprofit direc-
tors. Commonwealth by Kane v. New Founds., Inc., 182 A.3d 1059, 1068 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) 
(citing a Pennsylvania statute requiring that a nonprofit use its nonprofit funds for its charitable pur-
poses). 
 151 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999). In addition to boards of directors acting outside the 
scope of their mission statements, duty of obedience claims arise when nonprofit boards of directors 
accept donations contingent on donor restrictions. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 389–90. 
 152 Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive 
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 213 (2004) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Non-
profit Accountability]. Nonprofits altering their missions outside formal processes not only bring mis-
sion accountability into question, but also hurt the justification for the nonprofit sector’s preferred tax 
and societal status. Id. at 213–14. Requiring a nonprofit board of directors to abide by its nonprofit’s 
incorporating purpose, or amend such purpose if it wishes to act outside its purpose, enforces the 
credibility of the entire nonprofit sector. Id. at 215 (explaining that a nonprofit’s duty to obey its mis-
sion statement is critical to maintaining the integrity of its “societal role”). 
 153 See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 387–88 nn.205–06 (highlighting cases that discuss the 
duty of obedience in for-profit and nonprofit cases); Palmiter, supra note 145, at 458 (advocating for a 
revival of the duty of obedience in light of its history and desirability for the future). Delaware does 
not recognize a duty of obedience. In re Draw Another Circle, 602 B.R. 878, 893 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2019) (stating that Delaware courts do not recognize a duty of obedience). But see Oberly v. Kirby, 
592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) (noting that “because the [nonprofit] was created for a limited charita-
ble purpose rather than a generalized business purpose, those who control it have a special duty to 
advance its charitable goals and protect its assets”). In 1991, the Delaware Supreme Court held in 
Oberly v. Kirby that the directors’ purported bylaw amendment was “inconsistent with the overall 
structure of the Foundation and with the specific requirements” of its certificate of incorporation. 592 
A.2d at 458. 
 154 Palmiter, supra note 145, at 461. 
 155 Id. at 465. 
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the duty of obedience remains a tenet of the board’s duties to further the pur-
pose of its corporation.156 
Not all observers, however, look favorably upon recognizing a separate 
duty of obedience.157 The Restatement of the Law of Charitable Nonprofit Or-
ganizations (Restatement) rejects the idea of a separate duty of obedience, and 
instead adopts a wide conception of the duty of loyalty that requires directors 
to ensure their nonprofit always furthers the community interest.158 Nonethe-
less, the Restatement acknowledges a nonprofit director’s liability for ultra 
vires acts.159 
The Restatement does note, however, that in the charitable sector, fiduci-
aries must seek court approval before altering the target of their charitable 
funds and contributions.160 Scholars call this a “strong version of the duty of 
obedience” and explain that it makes sense in the charitable context because 
individuals donate money with a specific charitable purpose in mind.161 And, 
the Restatement considers a fiduciary’s duty to apply for permission to change 
their nonprofit’s purpose part of the duty of loyalty.162 
D. Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the Nonprofit Sector 
Unlike their for-profit counterparts, nonprofit organizations typically do 
not have shareholders.163 This is because nonprofits operate under a non-
distribution constraint that strictly prohibits any monetary distributions to indi-
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id. at 466–67 (establishing the fiduciary duty “to carry out the purposes of the organization as 
expressed in the articles or certificate of incorporation” (quoting JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN 
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 219 (3d ed. 2006))). 
 157 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02 cmt. m (AM. LAW. 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (noting that although some courts recognize a separate duty of 
obedience, the Restatement of the Law of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations (Restatement) does 
not). The Restatement technically addresses only charitable nonprofit organizations, but scholars note 
“shrinking operational differences” across nonprofit legal forms. Mayer, supra note 110, at 103–04. 
This Note relies on this “shrinking” and extends the Restatement’s views on charitable nonprofit fidu-
ciary duties onto the USOPC Board. See id. at 103 (defining, for purposes of analyzing fiduciary du-
ties, “all organizations that are subject to the nondistribution constraint”). 
 158 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02 cmts. e, m. 
 159 Id. § 2.02 cmt. n (citing to § 3.04 of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act). 
 160 Id. § 2.02(c). This subset of the duty of loyalty occurs under the doctrine of cy pres. Id. § 2.02 
cmt. a; Mayer, supra note 110, at 117 (describing the Restatement’s adoption of the doctrine of cy 
pres as “somewhat controversial[]”). Regarding charities, a “rededication of assets under the doctrine 
of cy pres” would fulfill a director’s duty of loyalty, in the event that such director wished to reorient 
the charity’s purpose and would obviate the need for a separate duty of obedience. Mayer, supra note 
110, at 117. 
 161 Mayer, supra note 110, at 117. 
 162 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02 cmt. a. 
 163 Fishman, supra note 143, at 225–26 (analogizing members of nonprofit corporations to share-
holders of for-profit corporations). 
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viduals.164 Judges and legislators restrict individuals who have standing to hold 
nonprofit boards accountable to the board itself (in some situations), attorneys 
general, and, in some jurisdictions, members of a nonprofit corporation.165 
First, directors of a nonprofit board or members of a nonprofit corporation 
may have standing to bring a derivative suit against a board for violations of 
fiduciary duties, depending on the jurisdiction.166 The Model Act allows that 
members constituting the lesser of either five percent of the entire membership 
or fifty members may bring a derivative suit against a nonprofit corporation, 
subject to certain membership and demand requirements.167 Even so, not all 
jurisdictions allow members to bring suit derivatively on behalf of the corpora-
tion.168 
Second, an attorney general can bring suit against a nonprofit board under 
its role as an “implicit guardian of charity.”169 Generally, state attorneys gen-
eral bring claims against nonprofits incorporated within their state.170 For ex-
ample, in 2018, in People v. Trump, the Supreme Court of New York County 
allowed New York’s Attorney General to bring claims against board directors 
                                                                                                                           
 164 Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 
(1981). 
 165 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-123-104 (2019) (allowing a director, voting members, and the 
attorney general to bring suits against a nonprofit corporation challenging its “power to act”); Mead & 
Pollack, supra note 144, at 297–98. 
 166 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(2) (allowing “any director or member of a desig-
nated body” to bring derivative suits against a nonprofit corporation); Mead & Pollack, supra note 
144, at 297 (recognizing that state statutes and courts dictate those with standing to bring derivative 
suits against a nonprofit corporation); see, e.g., Doermer v. Callen, 847 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(rejecting a non-member director’s contention that he had standing to sue a nonprofit corporation 
derivatively); Lundberg ex rel. Orient Found. v. Coleman, 60 P.3d 595, 598–99 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002) (concluding that where the controlling state statute did not allow for a minority director to sue 
derivatively, only the state attorney general had standing to sue). 
 167 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(1). The Model Act requires that suing members be 
members at the time of the alleged bad act and continue to be members throughout the proceeding. Id. 
§ 13.02(b). Additionally, the Model Act requires any person bringing a derivative suit to demand first 
that the board of directors pursue the action against the nonprofit corporation itself, or otherwise pro-
vide reasons why such demand would be futile. Id. § 13.03. 
 168 See, e.g., Tran v. Hoang, 481 S.W.3d 313, 316–17 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (citing a Texas statute 
as support for the conclusion that members lacked standing to derivatively sue a nonprofit’s board of 
directors). 
 169 Mead & Pollack, supra note 144, at 297; see Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 506 (empowering the 
attorney general to “act in the public good”). For an explanation of the development of attorneys gen-
eral’s roles in regulating nonprofit corporations, see Lizbeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of 
the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 251, 281–82 (1989); see also RE-
STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 2017) (tracing the modern attorney general power to regulate nonprofit corporations 
back to English common law). 
 170 Hansmann, supra note 164, at 600 (recognizing a general authority of state attorneys general 
to police nonprofit corporations). 
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of the Trump Foundation for an alleged breach of their fiduciary duties.171 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recognized 
that the United States, via the U.S. Attorney General, may sue on behalf of the 
public in the same way that state attorneys general do on behalf of their state 
citizens.172 
This restricted standing makes nonprofit corporations notoriously difficult 
to regulate.173 Additionally, commentators often doubt the effectiveness of at-
torneys general in holding nonprofits accountable, as they have limited re-
sources and people question their political motivations in acting.174 Attorneys 
general often investigate only nonprofit boards’ financial malfeasance, and 
tend to investigate potential breaches of care and obedience as ancillary mat-
ters.175 Scholars present alternative methods of nonprofit governance enforce-
                                                                                                                           
 171 88 N.Y.S.3d 830, 838–39, 841 (Sup. Ct. 2018). The case ultimately settled, and President 
Donald Trump paid $250,000 to eight different charities, totaling $2 million. Luis Ferre-Sadurní, 
Trump Pays $2 Million to 8 Charities for Misuse of Foundation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/nyregion/trump-foundation-lawsuit-attorney-general.html [https://
perma.cc/BTM7-S68V]. Additionally, the settlement required President Trump to admit wrongdoing 
and mandated that three of the President’s children, at the time members of the Trump Foundation’s 
board of directors, participate in remedial training. Id. 
 172 See Christiansen v. Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co., 683 F.2d 520, 527 (D.D.C. 1982) (distinguishing the 
case at bar from a case in which the United States presented as a party “suing on a public right”). The 
Christiansen court referred to United States v. Mount Vernon Mortgage Corp., which held that the 
United States acting under the doctrine of parens patriae had the power to pursue a suit against a 
nonprofit corporation for breaching its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its “unknown benefi-
ciaries.” Id. (citing United States v. Mount Vernon Mortg. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 629, 636 (D.D.C. 
1954)). 
 173 Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Accountability, supra note 152, at 206. As an example, West Vir-
ginia only allows directors to bring derivative actions when they allege the directors acted ultra vires, 
or beyond the scope of the nonprofit’s charter. Fanning v. John A. Sheppard Mem’l Ecological Reser-
vation, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01183, 2020 WL 597422, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting that the 
statute “should be interpreted narrowly” because the legislature did not desire broad standing to bring 
derivative claims). 
 174 Hansmann, supra note 164, at 601 (lamenting the limited state resources put towards policing 
nonprofit corporations); Eileen L. Morrison, Note, Enforcing the Duties of Nonprofit Fiduciaries: 
Advocating for Expanded Standing for Beneficiaries, 96 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 1, 5 (2016), https://
www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2015/11/MORRISON.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H3N-83HK] noting 
varied attentiveness of attorneys general across states). Additionally, unless a court requires an attor-
ney general sua sponte to bring a suit, the attorney general enjoys total discretion in whether to pursue 
a claim at all. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 5.01 cmt. d. In addi-
tion, attorneys general’s enforcement toolkits work for financial malfeasance, but struggle to regulate 
effectively the non-financial duty of loyalty and obedience violations. See Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit 
Accountability, supra note 152, at 220 (observing that attorneys general’s “existing skill sets and tools 
of enforcement” lend themselves to financial enforcement).  
 175 Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Accountability, supra note 152, at 208. Reiser identifies three areas 
where nonprofit boards of directors can run into trouble: (1) “financial accountability,” (2) “mission 
accountability,” and (3) “organizational accountability.” Id. at 210–19. “Mission accountability” re-
quires nonprofits to act within, and in furtherance of, their mission as stated in the articles of incorpo-
ration and bylaws. Id. at 212–13. Where directors wish to change a nonprofit corporation’s purpose, 
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ment, including media shaming, stricter enforcement by the IRS, and adoption 
of forward-looking reforms encouraging directors to inquire about the fiduci-
ary implications of board acts.176 Additionally, nonprofit law increasingly fo-
cuses on disclosure requirements as enhancing accountability.177 Finally, public 
enforcement of nonprofit corporations tends to impact not only the bad-acting 
nonprofit, but also causes an undesirable side effect of the public questioning 
the entire nonprofit sector.178 
II. SITUATING USOPC BOARD DECISIONS WITHIN THE  
NONPROFIT FIDUCIARY DUTY FRAMEWORK 
This Part, building upon Part I’s discussion of the pertinent aspects of the 
USOPC structure and governance as well as nonprofit fiduciary law, considers 
various acts by the USOPC Board in the context of nonprofit fiduciary du-
ties.179 Section A of this Part discusses to whom the USOPC Board owes fidu-
ciary duties.180 Section B compares the arbitral organizations referred to in the 
USOPC Bylaws with the Ted Stevens Act’s references to the AAA.181 Section 
B continues by considering whether this replacement was ultra vires, which 
would implicate the USOPC Board’s duty of loyalty.182 Section C of this Part 
subsequently examines the USOPC Bylaw’s updated mission statement in light 
of the enumerated purposes provided by the Ted Stevens Act.183 Section D of 
this Part discusses whether the USOPC Board’s grant allocation process impli-
cates its duty of obedience, and/or its duty of loyalty.184 
                                                                                                                           
they must amend its articles of incorporation. Id. at 213. Otherwise, the “economic rationale for the 
sector weakens.” Id. at 214. 
 176 Sugin, Strengthening Charity Law, supra note 116, at 874. 
 177 Id. at 881. 
 178 See Henry Goldstein, Opinion, Another Blow for the Public Image of Charities, CHRON. PHI-
LANTHROPY (May 15, 2003), https://www.oramgroup.com/publications/2003_05_cp.html [https://
perma.cc/E6VC-YYEX] (noting that a Supreme Court decision on a bad-acting nonprofit “was a ma-
jor victory for the public but a significant loss for charities seeking to win back public confidence in 
nonprofit organizations”). 
 179 See supra notes 32–178 and accompanying text (outlining the USOPC, the Ted Stevens Act, 
nonprofit fiduciary duties and enforcement mechanisms); infra notes 185–263 and accompanying text. 
 180 See infra notes 185–195 and accompanying text. 
 181 See infra notes 196–236 and accompanying text. 
 182 See infra notes 214–236 and accompanying text. 
 183 See infra notes 237–252 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra notes 253–263 and accompanying text. 
2722 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2695 
A. The USOPC Board Owes Fiduciary Duties to Its Chartered  
Purpose, Amateur Athletes, and the U.S. Public 
For a fiduciary duty to exist there must be a fiduciary relationship.185 The 
board of directors of a nonprofit corporation typically owes fiduciary duties to 
its incorporated purpose and consequently the nonprofit corporation itself.186 
Accordingly, there are at least four distinct beneficiaries to whom/which the 
USOPC Board may owe duties to: (1) the fifteen purposes laid out in the Ted 
Stevens Act; (2) the amateur athletes, as defined by the Ted Stevens Act, 
whom the fifteen enumerated purposes address; (3) the USOPC itself; and (4) 
the United States more generally.187 Courts and scholars widely accept that a 
nonprofit board owes fiduciary duties to the nonprofit corporation itself, which 
in turn exists to fulfill its incorporating purposes.188 It is therefore uncontrover-
sial to assume that the USOPC Board owes fiduciary duties to the USOPC it-
self and its enumerated purposes.189 
Whether the USOPC owes duties to amateur athletes or the United States 
more generally presents a more contested proposition, as evidenced by the fact 
that a USOPC lawyer in 2016 stated in a deposition that the USOPC “does not 
have athletes.”190 Nevertheless, fiduciary relationships occur where: 
(1) the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or 
power; (2) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or dis-
cretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; 
and (3) the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of 
the fiduciary holding discretion or power.191 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Mayer, supra note 110, at 105–06 (noting that only certain relationships “trigger a fiduci-
ary relationship”). 
 186 See id. at 105 (noting that whether fiduciaries owe a duty to the “nonprofit itself or instead 
with its purposes . . . generally does not alter the practical effect of that relationship”). 
 187 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (2018) (listing the congressionally mandated purposes of the USOPC); S. 
REP. NO. 95–770, at 5 (1978) (stating that the USOPC is accountable to the “amateur sports organiza-
tions and to the people of the United States for its actions”). 
 188 Mayer, supra note 110, at 105. 
 189 See id. at 105–06 (noting general acceptance, including from the Restatement, for the proposi-
tion that board members with “substantial powers” possess fiduciary duties vis-à-vis the nonprofit 
corporation they direct). 
 190 DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 151 (citing to Johansen Deposition, Gatt v. USA 
Taekwondo, No. BC599321 (Ca. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2016)). Recently, courts have concluded that the 
USOPC is not vicariously liable for sexual assault claims against NGB coaches because it does not 
have “direct control over the conduct of coaches.” See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
708, 716 (Ct. App. 2019) (dismissing the USOPC from suit). 
 191 Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 576 
(2015) (quoting EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 29–30 
(2011)).  
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Applying this fiduciary test, the USOPC Board owes fiduciary duties to ama-
teur athletes as well as to the U.S. public at large.192 First, the USOPC has the 
sole power to name an Olympic Team.193 Second, and in line with the first 
prong, an amateur athlete cannot self-appoint to an Olympic Team and accord-
ingly the USOPC’s decisions impact an amateur athlete’s “practical interests.”194 
Finally, because of the USOPC’s monopoly over Olympic Team naming, an 
amateur athlete is “peculiarly vulnerable” and “at the mercy” of the USOPC.195 
B. Arbitration Provision 
This Section addresses the divergence between the Ted Stevens Act’s and 
the 2020 Bylaws’ handling of the arbitration of USOPC decisions.196 The Ted 
Stevens Act lays out the procedure by which athletes can bring complaints 
against the USOPC, the process by which the USOPC handles such com-
plaints, and the right of a party to challenge the USOPC’s determination with 
the AAA.197 The 2020 Bylaws offer additional guidance on the arbitration of 
USOPC decisions, but provide that the USOPC Board has the right to deter-
mine the arbitral organization that will hear any appeal of the USOPC’s deci-
sions.198 
Subject to certain eligibility requirements, an organization or person can 
bring a complaint compelling an NGB to abide by its duties under the Ted Ste-
vens Act.199 The Ted Stevens Act then provides that the USOPC will hold a 
hearing and come to a determination.200 If the complaining party disagrees 
with the USOPC’s determination, the Ted Stevens Act gives such party the op-
portunity to seek recourse with the AAA.201 An example helps illustrate this 
process.202 
                                                                                                                           
 192 S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 5 (stating that the USOPC “must be responsive . . . to the people of the 
United States for its actions). 
 193 See 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c)(3) (listing the USOPC’s power to “organize, finance, and control 
the representation of the United States in the competitions and events of the Olympic Games”); De-
Frantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (D.D.C. 1980) (acknowledging that the 
USOPC has sole authority to name individuals to an Olympic Team). 
 194 See 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503(3)(A), 220505(c)(3) (granting the USOPC “control” over Olympic 
Team naming and “exclusive jurisdiction . . . [over] representation of the United States in the games”). 
 195 Id. § 220503(3)(A). This monopoly extends beyond naming an Olympic Team; it also includes 
controlling the use of the word “Olympic.” Id. § 220506(a)(4). 
 196 See infra notes 197–236 and accompanying text. 
 197 36 U.S.C. §§ 220527, 220529. 
 198 See 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (providing that the USOPC Board may 
select the arbitral organization in dispute resolution proceedings). 
 199 36 U.S.C. § 220527(a). 
 200 Id. § 220527(c). 
 201 Id. § 220529(a). 
 202 See infra notes 203–211 and accompanying text (providing an example). 
2724 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2695 
On January 29, 2018, Olympian Hope Solo filed a complaint against the 
United States Soccer Federation (USSF) alleging that the USSF violated nu-
merous Ted Stevens Act imposed duties.203 Solo’s complaint asked the 
USOPC, under section 220527 of the Ted Stevens Act, to put the USSF on 
probation and force the USSF to comply with the Ted Stevens Act’s require-
ments and the USOPC Bylaws.204 In response, the USSF moved to dismiss 
Solo’s complaint, alleging that she had not exhausted her internal remedies as 
required by the Ted Stevens Act.205 A USOPC hearing panel convened and 
granted the USSF’s motion to dismiss.206 The USOPC hearing panel concluded 
that Solo did not exhaust the USSF’s administrative procedures.207 In the hear-
ing panel’s order, it noted that Solo could appeal to the AAA for review in ac-
cordance with section 220529 of the Ted Stevens Act.208 Solo did just that, and 
                                                                                                                           
 203 Complaint Under Section 220527 of the Ted Stevens Act at 5–6, Solo v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, 
Inc. (U.S. Olympic Comm. Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Solo Complaint]. Solo alleged that the U.S 
Soccer Federation (USSF) violated the Ted Stevens Act by, among other things, failing to facilitate 
“equitable support and encouragement” for women’s sports and more broadly failing to fulfill its 
duties to act solely in the interests of amateur soccer players. Id. at 6. Solo also alleged that the USSF 
had no internal mechanism for dispute resolution because it relied on the AAA, and accordingly pro-
vided “no available remedies ‘within’ the USSF” to exhaust. Id. at 8. The Ted Stevens Act requires 
that before filing a complaint with the USOPC against an NGB a claimant must exhaust “all available 
remedies within the” NGB. 36 U.S.C. § 220527(b). Solo contended that because the USSF’s griev-
ance procedures involved filing with the AAA, such grievance procedure did not comply with the 
plain language of the Ted Stevens Act requiring internal resolution of NGB disputes. Solo Complaint, 
supra, at 8–9. Relatedly, the Ted Stevens Act tasks the USOPC with facilitating “swift resolution of 
conflicts and disputes” between, among other parties, amateur athletes and NGBs. 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220503(8). 
 204 Solo Complaint, supra note 203, at 7, 36. 
 205 Decision on Motion to Dismiss at 3–4, Solo v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n (U.S. Olympic Comm. July 
24, 2018) [hereinafter Solo Dismissal]. In addition to arguing that Solo did not utilize what the USSF 
considered to be permissible internal grievance procedures, the USSF moved to dismiss the complaint 
because it failed to state a claim. Id. 
 206 Id. at 5. Section 220527(b)(2) allows the USOPC to consider whether a complainant has pur-
sued all internal mechanisms before deciding an issue on the merits. 36 U.S.C. § 220527(b)(2). Sec-
tion 10.12 of the USOPC Bylaws reflects this statutory requirement, directing a hearing panel of indi-
viduals appointed by the USOPC CEO to make a preliminary determination on jurisdictional and 
procedural matters. 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 10.6, 10.12. The hearing panel must consist of 
one member of the USOPC Board, one member of the National Governing Body Council, and one 
member of the Athletes Advisory Committee. Id. § 10.6. The USOPC Bylaws do not require that one 
of these panel members be an attorney. See id. (outlining individuals who must be represented on the 
hearing panel, with no requirement that such group include an attorney). There is proposed legislation 
removing the exhaustion requirement from 36 U.S.C. § 220527. S. 2330, 116th Cong. § 7(d) (2020) 
(as engrossed by Senate, Aug. 4, 2020). 
 207 Solo Dismissal, supra note 205, at 5. In coming to this conclusion, the panel agreed with the 
USSF that utilizing the AAA for internal dispute resolution best served the interests of the parties. Id. 
at 10. The USSF focused not so much on whether the AAA constituted an internal or external organi-
zation, but rather on whether the AAA is a “fair and impartial” body. Id. 
 208 Id. at 7. The hearing panel also noted the availability of the AAA where a party is unsatisfied 
with the USOPC’s determinations in USOPC Section Nine of the USOPC Bylaws cases. See id. at 11 
n.2 (“[P]articipation cases brought by athletes, coaches, trainers, managers, administrators and offi-
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on May 28, 2019, the AAA arbitrators reversed the USOPC’s hearing panel 
determination.209 The panel of three arbitrators determined that the USSF’s 
internal grievance procedures contravened the Ted Stevens Act and the 
USOPC Bylaw requirements.210 The panel would not require Solo to “exhaust 
procedures that violate the laws of the United States.”211 
The USOPC Bylaws now state that “[a]ny party that considers itself ag-
grieved by a decision of the hearing panel . . . may . . . file a demand for arbi-
tration with the arbitral organization designated by the [USOPC] Board.”212 
The prior Bylaws mirrored the language used in section 220529 of the Ted 
Stevens Act, granting an aggrieved party the “right to review” the USOPC’s 
decision by the AAA.213 
                                                                                                                           
cials under Section [Nine] of the USOPC Bylaws are administered by the AAA and heard by AAA 
arbitrators.”). 
 209 Solo v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶ 11 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n May 28, 
2019) (Peterson, Albrecht, Witherspoon, Arbs.). 
 210 Id. The arbitrators noted that the USSF’s utilization of “duplicate AAA arbitrations” not only 
subjected Solo to “unnecessary delay,” but also stood “alone next to most, if not all, other NGBs that 
currently comply with the USOPC Bylaws.” Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Section 8.19.1 of the USOPC Bylaws task 
the “NGB Compliance team” with “overseeing[ing] matters involving potential or actual failures” of 
NGBs to comply with the Ted Stevens Act or USOPC Bylaws. 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, 
§ 8.19.1. This raises the question of whether, in addition to the implication of the duty of loyalty by 
ultra vires claims, courts could find that the USOPC Board breached its duty of oversight under a 
Caremark claim. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (providing a test for oversight claims). A successful Caremark claim satisfies one of two 
prongs: (1) proving that the corporation had no reporting system in place, or (2) proving that the cor-
poration failed to oversee an implemented reporting system. Id. Within the past year, plaintiff stock-
holders successfully pleaded Caremark claims where the boards of directors had and ignored a “mis-
sion critical.” See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (concluding food safety regu-
lations were an ice cream manufacturing board of directors’ “mission critical”). Just as an ice cream 
corporation’s board of directors’ “mission critical” is food safety, the USOPC Board’s “mission criti-
cal” could be the Ted Stevens Act itself. See id. (noting that food regulation is “the most central con-
sumer safety and legal compliance issue facing” Blue Bell). The USOPC owes its entire existence to 
the Ted Stevens Act, arguably making the Ted Stevens Act its “mission critical.” See 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220502(a) (“The corporation is a federally chartered corporation.”); Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824. 
Here, it appears that the USOPC Board had some type of reporting system in place. See 2020 BY-
LAWS, supra note 19, § 8.19.1 (detailing the NGB compliance team). But the USOPC Board, by ap-
proving the USSF’s internal grievance procedure, one that stood “alone next to most, if not all, other 
NGBs,” arguably failed to oversee such reporting system. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (identifying 
a board’s “mission critical” as part of a successful Caremark claim); Solo, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, 
¶¶ 17–18 (noting procedures that diverged from other NGBs’ procedures and the procedures required 
by the USOPC bylaws); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 8.19.1 (establishing the duty of the “NGB 
Compliance team” to ensure NGB compliance with Bylaw requirements). 
 211 Solo, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶ 11. The panel of arbitrators required the USSF to pay the 
administrative and legal fees of the arbitration and the arbitrators. Id. at 6. 
 212 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 10.21 (emphasis added). 
 213 Compare id. (stating that the USOPC may designate the arbitral organization of aggrieved 
party’s appeals of USOPC decisions), with 2019 BYLAWS, supra note 85, § 10.21 (allowing an ag-
grieved party the right to appeal an adverse decision to the AAA). 
2726 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2695 
As Part I Section 3 discusses, a board of directors breaches its fiduciary 
duty of loyalty if it causes the nonprofit corporation to violate positive law or 
its incorporating documents.214 The Ted Stevens Act plays the dual role of (1) 
incorporating the USOPC as a federally incorporated nonprofit corporation, 
and (2) establishing positive law that binds the USOPC Board’s acts.215 If the 
USOPC Board animates the USOPC to violate provisions of the Ted Stevens 
Act, it contravenes both positive law and its incorporating documents.216 
Therefore, such an act may subject the USOPC Board to viable claims that it 
breached its duty of loyalty.217 
The USOPC Board replaced “AAA” with an “arbitral organization desig-
nated by” itself in Section 10.21, as well as Sections 9.7 and 11.22, of the 2020 
Bylaws.218 The USOPC Board’s decision to alter this language potentially 
breached its duty of loyalty by causing the USOPC to violate section 220529 
of the Ted Stevens Act, which expressly grants an aggrieved party the right to 
review by the AAA USOPC decisions.219 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 
§ 3.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008) (providing standing for certain individuals to challenge the nonprofit’s 
acts as unauthorized). 
 215 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a); see Solo, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶ 11 (identifying the Ted Stevens 
Act as a U.S. law). 
 216 See 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (providing that the USOPC is a federally chartered nonprofit cor-
poration); Solo, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶ 11 (noting that the Ted Stevens Act is a U.S. law). 
 217 See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (stating that a director cannot act loyally if it causes the 
corporation to violate the law). Just as in the for-profit context, the nonprofit duty of loyalty encom-
passes the board of directors’ obligation to act in the best interests of the nonprofit. Mayer, supra note 
110, at 109. Violating the law, even if the director believes it to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, is never in the best interest of the corporation. See Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 352–53 
(Gen. Term 1909) (observing a violation of duty when a director violated the law to help the corpora-
tion). 
 218 Compare 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22, with 2019 BYLAWS, supra note 
85, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (replacing AAA with “arbitral organization designated by the Board”). The 
2020 Bylaws eliminate all references to the AAA, deleting it from the Bylaws’s definition section. 
Compare 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 1.3 (providing no reference to the AAA), with 2019 BY-
LAWS, supra note 85, § 1.3 (defining AAA as the American Arbitration Association). 
 219 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22; see Guttman, 823 
A.2d at 506 n.34 (stating that directors act disloyally when they cause the corporation to violate the 
law). Courts require that a viable breach of duty of loyalty claim premised on a violation of positive 
law involve a board’s “knowing” violation of such law. See In re Capital One Derivative S’holder 
Litig., 952 F. Supp. 2d 770, 784 (E.D. Va. 2013). A positive violation of law can include both a viola-
tion of external law and of internal law, such as a corporation’s articles of incorporation. Thomas A. 
Uebler, Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors Accountable, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 199, 210 (2008). Title 36 corporations, like the USOPC, present a unique situation where 
external and internal law are one and the same. See Solo, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶ 11 (implying 
that actions that violate the USOPC’s incorporating document—the Ted Stevens Act—also violate 
positive United States law). Where a board of directors unknowingly violates positive law, courts may 
find that the board of directors did not breach its duty of loyalty. See Capital One, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 
784 (couching duty of loyalty claims related to positive violations of the law within “bad faith” ac-
tions, thereby requiring a knowing violation of the law); Lebanon Cty. Emp.’s. Ret. Fund & Team-
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Additionally, knowing violations of law that do not center around director 
self-dealing raise issues of ripeness, damages, and remedies.220 This issue is 
particularly complex in the nonprofit arena because it is impossible to point to 
rising or falling share prices as indicia of damage.221 In for-profit corporate 
law, courts observe ripe claims where a board revokes contractual rights of 
stockholders.222 The Delaware Court of Chancery, for example, held that when 
a board of directors interfered with a stockholder’s existing contractual rights, 
the stockholder’s claim was ripe for review even though the stockholder had 
not moved to exercise the rights.223 
Similarly, the USOPC Board taking away the right to review by the AAA 
from the aggrieved party and giving it to itself may be ripe for review.224 
Countering this argument is the Ted Stevens Act’s legislative history which 
states that the Ted Stevens Act does not create substantive athlete rights.225 
Under this reading, an athlete never had a right the USOPC could take away 
because Congress did not intend to give such athlete any substantive right to 
arbitration by the AAA.226 The USOPC Board may also argue that, even if the 
athlete has a right, until the USOPC Board selects an arbitral organization oth-
er than the AAA, there is no claim that it violated an athlete’s right to recourse 
by the AAA.227 
                                                                                                                           
sters Local 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 
WL 132752, at *21 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020) (“When directors consciously fail to prevent violations of 
positive law, then they act in bad faith.”). 
 220 See Uebler, supra note 219, at 216–19 (discussing the issue of damages in the context of ille-
gal board acts). 
 221 See id. at 218–19 (arguing that harm should reflect whether the net loss of share price exceeds 
the gain in share price resulting from the illegal act). 
 222 See Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729, 737–738 & n.21 (Del. Ch. 2016) (collecting cases where 
a court considered bylaw challenges ripe for review, especially where such bylaws had a “deterrent 
effect”); KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Checchi, 698 A.2d 380, 384 (Del. Ch. 1997) (finding a ripe 
claim where a bylaw provision “presently interferes with [the stockholder’s] contractual rights”). 
 223 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 698 A.2d at 384. In 1997, in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, the plain-
tiff stockholder, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), alleged that the defendant, the board of directors 
of Northwest Airlines (Northwest Board), violated its fiduciary duty by adopting a takeover defense 
mechanism (a commonly called “poison pill”) that essentially caused Northwest Airlines to violate 
existing contractual obligations. Id. at 381–82. The Northwest Board argued that KLM’s claim was 
unripe because it did not know whether it would ever exercise the poison pill and thereby breach its 
contract with KLM. Id. at 382. The Delaware Court of Chancery rejected the Northwest Board’s claim 
because its adoption of the poison pill “presently interfer[ed] with [KLM’s] contractual rights to exer-
cise the option in the future.” Id. at 384. 
 224 See id. at 384 (finding a claim ripe for review where the board breached its fiduciary duties by 
interfering with existing contractual rights). 
 225 See S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 5–6 (noting the exclusion of substantive athlete rights in the Ted 
Stevens Act itself, but acknowledging their presence in the USOPC’s Constitution or Bylaws). 
 226 Id. The Senate Report does note, however that “[f]or the first time, [athletes’] rights to com-
pete in amateur athletic competition are legislatively being recognized.” Id. at 6. 
 227 See 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (leaving open the possibility that the 
USOPC may select the AAA as the arbitral forum). 
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Finally, Section 22.3 of the USOPC Bylaws state that no Bylaw will force 
the USOPC to act contrary to the Ted Stevens Act.228 Savings clauses, like 
USOPC Bylaw Section 22.3, do not automatically save otherwise invalid or 
illegal provisions.229 Where a court cannot read a challenged Bylaw provision 
harmoniously with positive law in any circumstance, the savings clause is una-
vailing.230 For example, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated in 2016, in 
Solak v. Sarowitz, that where a bylaw advanced a fee-shifting scheme directly 
contrary to Delaware law, a savings clause did not save the bylaw’s validity.231 
Here, the debate is whether one can read the USOPC Bylaw giving the 
USOPC Board the right to select the arbitral association in any way to match 
the Ted Stevens Act granting an aggrieved party the “right to review” the 
USOPC’s determinations with the AAA.232 On the one hand, the USOPC tak-
ing complete control over which arbitral association an aggrieved party must 
file with directly contradicts the Ted Stevens Act’s granting of that right to the 
aggrieved party.233 Under that interpretation, the savings clause is unavail-
ing.234 On the other hand, the USOPC could choose the AAA as the arbitral 
                                                                                                                           
 228 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 22.3. 
 229 Solak, 153 A.3d at 742–43. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. The plaintiff stockholder in Solak v. Sarowitz facially challenged the validity of a fee-
shifting bylaw. Id. at 733. The bylaw purported “to the fullest extent permitted by law” to shift attor-
ney’s fees onto a plaintiff stockholder, directly contradicting DGCL section 109(b), which prohibits 
shifting attorney’s fees onto the plaintiff stockholder. Id. at 740–41; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 109(b) (2019). In 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery held the fee-shifting bylaw facially invalid 
and explicitly noted that the savings language, “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” did not save 
the bylaw. Solak, 153 A.3d at 742–43. DGCL section 109(b) prohibited “any” fee-shifting scheme, 
thereby leaving the entirety of the bylaw invalid. Id. at 743; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b). 
Accordingly, there was nothing “left in the challenged provision for the savings clause to save.” Solak, 
153 A.3d at 743. 
 232 See City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 236 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(finding that savings clause saved bylaw provision). In 2014, in First Citizens BancShares, the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery concluded that a forum selection clause did not facially violate Delaware law. 
Id. at 233. There, Delaware law did not encompass the entirety of possible claims the forum selection 
clause covered. Id. at 236. The forum selection clause had a savings clause that limited its reach “to 
the fullest extent permitted by law.” Id. This allowed claims that must be brought in Delaware to be 
brought there. Id. Accordingly, Delaware law did not completely subsume the bylaw, and the savings 
clause had something to save. Id.; see Solak, 153 A.3d at 743 (implying that a savings clause would 
save a bylaw if there was something left of it to save). 
 233 Compare 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a) (granting the “right to review” by the AAA for an aggrieved 
party), with 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (allowing the USOPC Board to pick 
the arbitral organization for review of an aggrieved party’s claim). 
 234 See Solak, 153 A.3d at 743 (finding the savings clause irrelevant when the entirety of the by-
law contradicts the relevant state law). Even assuming the savings clause saves the 2020 Bylaw provi-
sions purportedly granting the USOPC the right to choose the arbitral organization, the USOPC Board 
may have breached its fiduciary duties by adopting a Bylaw that “can never operate consistently with 
law.” See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 948–49 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(indicating that plaintiffs could prevail in a facial challenge of a bylaw if they prove that no circum-
stance exists where the challenged bylaw comports with the law); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, 
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association, thereby leaving the end result identical.235 The savings clause may 
save the provision under that interpretation.236 
C. Purpose and Mission Statement 
In the typical state-incorporated nonprofit corporation, such corporation’s 
mission statement must track its purpose as defined in its governance docu-
ments, including the articles of incorporation.237 If a nonprofit board of direc-
tors causes the corporation to deviate from its incorporating purpose, those 
directors may violate either their duty of loyalty, or, if recognized, their sepa-
rate duty of obedience.238 
The Ted Stevens Act identifies fifteen purposes for which Congress in-
corporated the USOPC as a nonprofit corporation.239 Relevant to this Note, 
Congress identified “amateur athlete[s],” “amateur athletic competition,” and 
“amateur sports organization[s]” as the targets of the USOPC’s actions.240 The 
Ted Stevens Act defines an “amateur athlete” as “an athlete who meets the eli-
gibility standards established by the [NGB] or paralympic sports organization 
for the sport in which the athlete competes.”241 
                                                                                                                           
§§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (purporting to establish that the USOPC has the authority to select the arbitral 
association). Section 220529 of the Ted Stevens Act states that an “aggrieved” party “may obtain 
review by any regional office of the [AAA].” 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a). The Ted Stevens Act, for com-
plaints arising under §§ 220527 or 220528, does not offer any other arbitral association as a potential 
arbitral forum. See id. Section 220529 lays out the procedure by which “the Association” provides 
notice and selects an arbitration venue. Id. § 220529(b). The Ted Stevens Act refers to the Associa-
tion, not an association. See id. The argument goes, then, that the adopted Bylaws “can never operate 
consistently with law” and the USOPC Board breached its fiduciary duties. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d 
at 948–49. 
 235 See 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (allowing the AAA to still be designat-
ed as the arbitral association by not explicitly stating that a different arbitral association will be used). 
 236 See First Citizens BancShares, 99 A.3d at 236 (finding that a savings clause saved the bylaw). 
 237 See Palmiter, supra note 145, at 467 (noting that the duty of obedience requires a nonprofit 
board of directors’ actions to “track[] and reinforce[]” the nonprofit’s purposes and mission as desig-
nated in its incorporating documents). Assuming the mission statement properly tracks the nonprofit’s 
purpose, directors must then act within the confines of the nonprofit’s mission statement. Joseph M. 
Long, A Contextual Study of the Non-Profit Duty of Obedience: The National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 125, 133–34 (2013) (stating that mission statements 
constrain nonprofit director action). 
 238 See Palmiter, supra note 145, at 467 (identifying the duty to act within constraints of incorpo-
rating purpose). 
 239 36 U.S.C. § 220503. 
 240 See id. (stating, for example, that the USOPC must “assist organizations and persons con-
cerned with sports in the development of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes” and “pro-
mote a safe environment in sports that is free from abuse, including emotional, physical, and sexual 
abuse, of any amateur athlete”). The Senate Committee Report also identified “amateur sports organi-
zations and . . . the people of the United States” as those to whom the USOPC must respond. S. REP. 
NO. 95-770, at 5.  
 241 36 U.S.C. § 220501(b)(1). An “‘amateur athletic competition’ means a contest, game, meet, 
match, tournament, regatta, or other event in which amateur athletes compete.” Id. § 220501(b)(2). An 
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The USOPC’s mission statement provides that “the mission of the corpo-
ration is to empower Team USA athletes to achieve sustained competitive ex-
cellence and well-being.”242 The USOPC Bylaws do not define “Team USA 
athletes.”243 The USOPC website does, however, provide a searchable biog-
raphy bank of 7,134 Team USA athletes.244 The website does not provide the 
characteristics that qualify an athlete as a “Team USA athlete.”245 
Although defined criteria for being considered a Team USA athlete is not 
apparent, the categorization necessarily constitutes only a portion of U.S. ama-
teur athletes, as defined by the Ted Stevens Act.246 The United States Ski and 
Snowboard Association (USSA), the USOPC-recognized NGB for the sports 
of skiing and snowboarding, alone reported 34,568 members in 2018.247 USA 
Track and Field (USATF) identifies more than 130,000 members, and USA 
                                                                                                                           
“‘amateur sports organization’ means a not-for-profit corporation, association, or other group orga-
nized in the United States that sponsors or arranges an amateur athletic competition.” Id. 
§ 220501(b)(3). 
 242 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.1. The Bylaws also lay out subsidiary “Core Principles:” 
• We promote and protect athletes’ rights, safety, and wellness 
• We champion the integrity of sport 
• We respect the important role of our member organizations and support their need for suc-
cess 
• We set clear standards of organizational excellence and hold ourselves and all member or-
ganizations accountable 
• We engage as a trusted and influential leader to advance the global Olympic and Paralym-
pic Movements 
• We honor and celebrate the legacy of Olympic & Paralympic athletes 
Id. 
 243 See id. § 1.3 (providing no definition of “Team USA Athletes” in definition section). 
 244 Athletes, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://www.teamusa.org/athletes 
[https://perma.cc/JLH8-G2WR]. 
 245 Id. The list of athletes includes individuals who have represented the United States at an 
Olympic Game. See, e.g., Shaun White, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://www.
teamusa.org/us-ski-and-snowboard/athletes/Shaun-White [https://perma.cc/K8J5-GPMW] (listing 
Shaun White as competing in four separate Olympic Games). The list of athletes also includes, how-
ever, individuals who have not represented the United States at an Olympic Game. See, e.g., Gia 
Dalesandro, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://www.teamusa.org/usa-swimming/
athletes/Gia-Dalesandro [https://perma.cc/38Q6-L3PS] (listing Gia Dalesandro as a Team USA ath-
lete, although she did not represent the United States at an Olympic Game). Dalesandro did compete 
in the 2016 Olympic Trials in the 200-meter Butterfly. Gia Dalesandro, IND. U. (2016–2017), https://
iuhoosiers.com/sports/womens-swimming-and-diving/roster/gia-dalesandro/8298 [https://perma.
cc/PND4-XRE7]. 
 246 See 36 U.S.C. § 220501(b)(1) (defining amateur athlete); infra notes 247–248 and accompany-
ing text (providing membership data for various USOPC recognized NGBs). 
 247 U.S. SKI & SNOWBOARD ASS’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2018), https://usskiandsnow
board.org/sites/default/files/files-resources/files/2019/USS_18AnnualReport_FA.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3T3K-DN2W] [hereinafter SKI & SNOWBOARD REPORT]. 
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Gymnastics states that it has over “200,000 athletes, professionals and club 
members.”248 
Congress charged the USOPC with protecting and providing services for 
all amateur athletes.249 Therefore, the USOPC Board may have breached its 
fiduciary duty of obedience by narrowing the scope of athletes it identifies in 
its mission statement.250 Alternatively, the USOPC Board may have breached 
its duty of loyalty by altering its mission statement without a corresponding 
change to its federally chartered purpose.251 The USOPC Board would likely 
argue that courts do not recognize a separate duty of obedience, and in the al-
ternative the sub-principle identifying the USOPC aim of protecting “athletes’ 
rights, safety, and wellness” satisfies their congressionally mandated purpose 
by encompassing “amateur athletes.”252 
D. Resource Allocation Decisions Concerning NGB Funding 
In addition to updating its mission statement, the USOPC Board engages 
in and approves activities that may violate the USOPC Board’s duty of obedi-
ence, or in the alternative duty of loyalty, by deviating from its congressionally 
incorporated purpose.253 The Ted Stevens Act tasks the USOPC with fielding 
“the most competent amateur representation possible in each event” of the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games.254 Yet in determining which NGBs receive 
USOPC grants, and how much money each grant provides, the USOPC “stra-
                                                                                                                           
 248 About USA Gymnastics, USA GYMNASTICS, https://usagym.org/pages/aboutus/pages/about_
usag.html [https://perma.cc/4WMB-ASY3]; About USATF, USA TRACK & FIELD, https://www.usatf.
org/about [https://perma.cc/9XDB-A74U]. 
 249 36 U.S.C. § 220503. The Ted Stevens Act does not reference Team USA athletes anywhere 
within its text. See id. 
 250 See Long, supra note 237, at 133 (stating that the duty of obedience requires directors to act in 
furtherance and within the constraints of its purposes); Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Accountability, 
supra note 152, at 213 (stating that directors may act only “[w]ithin the range of the mission articulat-
ed in its statement of purpose”). 
 251 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02(c) (AM. LAW. 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (identifying, as part of the duty of loyalty, the requirement under 
the “doctrine of cy pres or deviation” that a board of directors seek judicial permission before altering 
its charitable purpose (emphasis added)). 
 252 About the U.S. Olympic & Paralympic Committee, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, 
https://www.teamusa.org/about-the-usopc [https://perma.cc/8CX8-WXZN]; see 36 U.S.C. § 220503 
(identifying congressionally mandated purposes of the USOPC); Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization, 
supra note 146, at 902 (“[T]he duty of obedience is carried out broadly with respect to consideration 
of the activities of the organization, rather than solely with reference to the purposes written in the 
documents.” (footnote omitted)). 
 253 See Long, supra note 237, at 148 (noting that nonprofit director actions must reflect the non-
profit’s mission statement). 
 254 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4). 
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tegically allocates” the grants “using a results-driven resource-allocation pro-
cess.”255 
For example, in 2011 the USOPC established a hierarchy of NGB fund-
ing.256 The USOPC made funding decisions based on a tripartite breakdown of 
NGBs: (1) NGBs with the highest chance of medal success, “foundation” 
NGBs, receive the most money; (2) NGBs with a “chance” to win a medal 
stand second in line; and finally (3) NGBs characterized as “development’ or-
ganizations,” which stood little chance of receiving direct USOPC funding.257 
The USOPC’s Form 990 provides grant amounts for any grant-recipient re-
ceiving $5,000 or more.258 The highest NGB grant amounts went to the USSA 
($6,089,500), USATF ($3,991,080), and USA Swimming ($3,412,807).259 
                                                                                                                           
 255 Financial Resources, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://www.teamusa.org/
Team-USA-Athlete-Services/Financial-Resources [https://perma.cc/BN3W-GC6G]. The Financial 
Resources page also identifies “Operation Gold” awards given to athletes who win medals at the 
Olympics or Paralympics, or in non-Olympic or non-Paralympic years, the highest international com-
petition. Id. For both Olympic and Paralympic athletes, a gold medal delivers $37,500, a silver 
$22,500, and a bronze $15,000. Id. 
 256 Tripp Mickle, USOC Funding Strategy Worries Small NGBs, SPORTS BUS. J. (Oct. 3, 2011), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/10/03/Olympics/NGB-funding.aspx [https://
perma.cc/K8NV-25TN]; see DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 144 (explaining that the most 
important factor in USOPC funding decisions is the medal potential of an NGB, followed by the 
“marketability of successful athletes,” in distributing funds). 
 257 Mickle, supra note 256. At the time of the announced funding strategy, Steve Pastorino, then-
general manager for USA Handball, remarked that he “would just like to have a substantial conversa-
tion about what the Olympic movement is all about. Is it really just medal count?” Id. 
 258 U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., 2018 FORM 990, at 41–46 (2019) [hereinafter 2018 
FORM 990]. Additionally, the USOPC’s Form 990 states that the USOPC determined it is “sometimes 
beneficial” for the spouses of the “CEO and Board Members” to attend the Olympics. Id. at 53. The 
USOPC’s Form 990 also reveals that Scott Blackmun, the former CEO, received a $2.4 million sever-
ance package. Id. at 51. Each and every one of these financial expenditures must be in furtherance of 
the USOPC’s purpose and mission statement for the USOPC Board to have acted obediently and loy-
ally. See Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Accountability, supra note 152, at 213. 
 259 2018 FORM 990, supra note 258, at 41–46. The largest reported grant, $12,598,847, went to the 
U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Foundation. Id. at 46. The USOPC also gave lower grant amounts, for 
example a grant of $7,500 to Central Cross Country Skiing (CXC). Id. at 42. CXC has 2,000 members 
and is the Midwest’s regional governing body for cross country skiing, as well as a “Gold Level Para-
lympic Sport Club.” About Central Cross Country Skiing (CXC), CENT. CROSS COUNTRY SKIING, http://
www.cxcskiing.org/pages/about/mission-and-vision.html [https://perma.cc/8Q2H-YYK8]. The U.S. 
Ski and Snowboard Association’s (USSA) grant represented almost 17% of its 2018 revenue. SKI & 
SNOWBOARD REPORT, supra note 247, at 55. The most recent Olympic participation numbers for the 
highest grant-receiving NGBs are 111 athletes from USSA, 129 athletes from USATF, and 47 athletes 
from USA Swimming. See 2018 U.S. Olympic Team by Sport, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COM-
MITTEE, https://www.teamusa.org/pyeongchang-2018-olympic-winter-games/team-usa/athletes [https://
perma.cc/9JCW-XR9E]; 2016 U.S. Olympic Team by Sport, U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMIT-
TEE, https://www.teamusa.org/road-to-rio-2016/team-usa/athletes [https://perma.cc/2CMX-49M3]. 
Based on the number of Olympians present at their respective games, USSA receives approximately 
$54,860 per Olympic athlete, and USATF received approximately $30,938 per Olympic athlete. See 
2018 FORM 990, supra note 258, at 41–46 (providing grant amounts); 2018 U.S. Olympic Team by 
Sport, supra note 259; 2016 U.S. Olympic Team by Sport, supra note 259. If based purely on member-
ship numbers, USSA receives $179 per member, and USATF receives $30 per member. See 2018 
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This process of grant-giving may violate the USOPC Board’s duty of 
obedience.260 A “results-driven resource-allocation process” determining dis-
parate grant awards does not further the USOPC’s chartered purpose of provid-
ing “the most competent amateur representation possible in each” Olympic or 
Paralympic event, which constitutes a potential violation of the duty of obedi-
ence.261 Here, disproportionate support of events, based on past or future NGB 
performance, does not track the requirement that the USOPC provide compe-
tent amateur athlete representation in each event.262 If the grants are based on 
criteria other than fielding the most competent team of amateur athletes, then 
the USOPC Board is not acting within the constraints of the Ted Stevens Act, 
or its mission statement.263 
                                                                                                                           
FORM 990, supra note 258, at 41–46 (providing grant amounts); SKI & SNOWBOARD REPORT, supra 
note 247, at 28 (providing membership numbers); About USATF, supra note 248 (providing member-
ship numbers). USA Gymnastics received $2,222,601 in USOPC grants in 2018, which breaks down 
to $123,477 per athlete at the 2016 Olympic Games, but only $11 per member. See 2018 FORM 990; 
2016 U.S. Olympic Team by Sport, supra note 259 (detailing the number of gymnast Olympians at the 
2016 games); About USA Gymnastics, supra note 248 (providing membership numbers). Additionally, 
the USOPC notes that the grant giving process aims to provide the “greatest number of American 
athletes the opportunity to reach the podium.” Financial Resources, supra note 255. 
 260 See Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Accountability, supra note 152, at 213 (allowing a nonprofit to 
permissibly act only “within the range of the mission articulated in its statement of purpose”). 
 261 36 U.SC. § 220503(4); Financial Resources, supra note 255; cf. Long, supra note 237, at 143–
50 (applying a similar mode of analysis in determining whether National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) acts were within the scope of its mission statement). Long’s article examines the duty of 
obedience as it relates to actions taken by the board of directors of the NCAA (NCAA Board). Id. at 
143. In concluding that the NCAA Board breached its duty of obedience, Long first determines that 
all NCAA Board actions must further its stated mission of supporting student-athletes, with the first 
priority being a student-athlete’s education. Id. at 141. Long then looks at three NCAA Board deci-
sions. Id. at 143–50. For example, he argues that the NCAA Board decision to donate to UNICEF’s 
Haitian Relief fund following a series of earthquakes violated the NCAA Board’s duty of obedience 
because such donation did not further the NCAA’s mission statement. Id. at 146. Long recognizes the 
NCAA Board’s positive intentions, but nevertheless concludes that the donation violated the NCAA 
Board’s duty of obedience because it acted “outside the scope of its mission statement.” Id. 
 262 See Long, supra note 237, at 148 (arguing that nonprofit leaders may not make decisions in a 
vacuum, but rather the “decisions must fulfill the specific mission of the non-profit organization”). 
 263 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (requiring the USOPC to act in furtherance of obtaining “the most 
competent representation in each event” (emphasis added)). Some note the correlation between grant 
amounts and TV viewership. See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Why Is the US Olympic Committee Tax-
Exempt?, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxvox/why-us-olympic-committee-tax-exempt-1 [https://perma.cc/2H8N-EKRL]. The USOPC’s 
2016 Tax Return shows a disparity in grant amounts and also reveals that the USOPC’s direct athlete 
funding in 2016 accounted for 8% of its 2016 revenues. Id. (observing, too, that in 2016 the USOPC 
had a $78 million positive margin and questioning whether the USOPC operates more like a for-profit 
corporation than a nonprofit one). Id. It is important here to distinguish the duty of loyalty from the 
duty of care in regards to funding decisions. See Mayer, supra note 110, at 109–10, 113–15 (describ-
ing duties of loyalty and care as distinct duties). If challenging the funding system under a duty of care 
claim, the USOPC Board, under the “best judgment” presumption, would likely argue that different 
sports require different levels of funding to achieve competence and thereby justify the disparate fund-
ing levels. See id. at 115 (comparing the for-profit corporation “business judgment rule” to the non-
profit “best judgment rule,” which releases nonprofit directors from alleged breaches of their duties of 
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III. THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL SHOULD PURSUE CLAIMS AGAINST THE 
USOPC BOARD FOR BREACHES OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The chances of making an Olympic Team are low.264 Olympic hopefuls 
must initially clear two large hurdles: the money and time required to train and 
travel, and the competition to qualify.265 Athletes must also clear a third hurdle: 
the USOPC itself.266 With the Ted Stevens Act, Congress incorporated the 
USOPC as a federally chartered nonprofit corporation holding an intended be-
nevolent monopoly over organized Olympic sports in the United States.267 The 
Ted Stevens Act requires the USOPC to obtain for the United States “the most 
competent amateur representation possible in each event of the Olympic 
Games [and] the Paralympic Games,” all the while protecting “the opportunity 
of any amateur athlete” to compete in protected competitions.268 
                                                                                                                           
care if the director acts “on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the reasonable belief they were 
doing so in the best interests of the nonprofit”). The loyalty claim, however, focuses on the motivation 
for the funding. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 356 (distinguishing the duty of care as focusing 
on the decision-making process, and the duty of loyalty on the motivations for a decision). If, as 
Ropes’s Report suggested, a consideration in grant dispersal is the “marketability of successful ath-
letes,” then the USOPC Board breached its duty of loyalty because its motivation was not providing 
the “most competent amateur representation possible in each event.” See 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (stat-
ing that one purpose of the USOPC is to “to obtain . . . the most competent amateur representation 
possible”); DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 144 (identifying principles for USOPC funding 
decisions as first medal-winning capability and second “marketability”). Similarly, the USOPC Board 
breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty if funding decisions are driven by sport popularity or TV view-
ership. See Gleckman, supra note 263 (observing the correlation between grant amounts and TV pop-
ularity). The USOPC Board abides by its fiduciary duties only if each and every funding decision is 
driven by the desire to field a competent team in each event. See 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (stating one 
USOPC purpose); Hazen & Hazen, supra note 17, at 349 (observing that nonprofit law recognizes a 
director duty of loyalty to “act solely in the beneficiary’s best interests”); see also Palmiter at 467 (ex-
plaining that the duty of obedience requires nonprofit directors to act in furtherance of the nonprofit’s 
mission and in compliance with “external legal regimes”). 
 264 See Scooby Axon, How Many Americans Are Competing at the Olympics?, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.si.com/olympics/2018/02/09/team-usa-competing-pyeongchang-
olympics [https://perma.cc/5FKU-YHXA] (reporting that 244 Americans were named to the 2018 
U.S. Winter Olympic Team, the largest team to date). For comparison, the United States’ population 
is (as of September 25, 2020) approximately 330,220,600 people. U.S. and World Population Clock, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/9PK6-ZBDE]. 
 265 See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Complexity and the Ten-Thousand-Hour Rule, NEW YORKER 
(Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/sports/sporting-scene/complexity-and-the-ten-thousand-
hour-rule [https://perma.cc/N2ZW-REBY] (explaining the 10,000 hour “rule,” which theorizes that it 
takes 10,000 hours to master a skill). 
 266 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c)(3) (2018) (including in the USOPC’s powers the capacity to “organize, 
finance, and control the representation of the United States in” the Olympics, Paralympics, and Pan-
American Sports Organization). 
 267 See id. § 220503(3)(A) (granting the USOPC control over “all matters pertaining to United 
States participation in the” Olympic and Paralympic Games, among other competitions). 
 268 Id. § 220503(4), (8); see, e.g., Reininger v. U.S. Rowing Ass’n, Case No. 72-199-0908-88, at 
16 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n Aug. 30, 1988) (Hart, Arb.) (“The magnitude of the honor of representing 
the United States on an Olympic Team is such that the Congress has required that every effort be 
made at selecting athletes to represent the United States in a fair and equitable manner.”). 
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The USOPC makes the third hurdle increasingly difficult for athletes to 
clear—the USOPC’s 2020 Bylaws purport to restrict athletes protected by the 
USOPC to “Team USA athletes” while they simultaneously increase the 
USOPC’s power over the dispute resolution process.269 Additionally, the 
USOPC’s resource-allocation regime gives it control over how much money to 
grant NGBs and the metrics used to make this decision.270 Curiously absent is 
consideration of the congressionally-given rights imputed to all amateur ath-
letes.271 
Research has not uncovered an action against the USOPC Board for a 
breach of its fiduciary duties, perhaps because athletes do not know they have 
any rights at all.272 Section A proposes that enforcement by the U.S. Attorney 
General is one of the only ways to hold the USOPC Board accountable and 
protect amateur athletes.273 Section B proposes the Attorney General should 
require the USOPC to abide by its fiduciary duties and comply with the Ted 
Stevens Act, thereby securing the rights of amateur athletes who Congress in-
corporated the USOPC to protect.274 
A. The U.S. Attorney General Is the Proper Enforcer 
Typically, state statutes empower their respective state attorneys general 
to hold nonprofit boards of directors accountable for breaches of their fiduciary 
duty.275 This stems from an attorney general’s perceived role as protector of the 
public interest.276 
Courts consider the USOPC as possessing “nationalized citizenship,” 
which, in addition to defeating diversity jurisdiction, leaves the USOPC with-
                                                                                                                           
 269 See supra notes 179–252 and accompanying text (explaining each of these two Bylaw changes 
in more detail). 
 270 See supra notes 253–263 and accompanying text (describing in more detail the USOPC’s 
resource-allocation process). 
 271 See 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.1 (neglecting to mention amateur athletes in the mission 
statement). 
 272 See Sally Jenkins, Opinion, Michael Phelps Says Olympians Face Greater Mental Health 
Risks. Does the USOPC Care?, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/olympics/michael-phelps-says-olympians-face-greater-mental-health-risks-does-the-usopc-
care/2020/02/11/72afec9c-4ce9-11ea-b721-9f4cdc90bc1c_story.html [https://perma.cc/6XVG-8M4R] 
(quoting two-time gold medal winner at the 2012 Skeleton World Championships Katie Uhlaender as 
saying that athletes “have no rights. To be clear, the only right [athletes] have is the right to com-
pete”). 
 273 See infra notes 275–303 and accompanying text (explaining why the U.S. Attorney General is 
the proper party). 
 274 See infra notes 304–349 and accompanying text (arguing that the Attorney General should 
pursue the three USOPC actions laid out in Part II of this Note because the USOPC Board breached 
its fiduciary duties in so acting). 
 275 Mayer, supra note 110, at 121; Mead & Pollack, supra note 144, at 297–98. 
 276 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW. 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2017). 
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out a state attorney general to oversee it.277 Because of the USOPC’s national-
ized citizenship designation and its status as a federally incorporated nonprofit 
corporation, the U.S. Attorney General is the proper party to bring a suit en-
forcing the USOPC Board’s fiduciary obligations.278 
The other attorneys general whom potentially have standing are the Colo-
rado Attorney General and the Attorney General for the District of Colum-
bia.279 The Colorado Attorney General may have standing because the USOPC 
is headquartered in Colorado.280 The Attorney General for the District of Co-
lumbia could also potentially have standing because the USOPC indicates on 
its 2018 Tax Return that it is legally domiciled in the District of Columbia.281 
Two points refute possible contentions that any state attorney general has 
standing to bring a suit enforcing the USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties.282 First, 
the Ted Stevens Act itself references “the Attorney General” in its subsection 
relating to grants for protecting young athletes from abuse.283 This indicates 
that Congress already views the U.S. Attorney General as having some over-
sight authority.284 
Second, the Ted Stevens Act states under the subsection on organization 
that the USOPC is “a federally chartered corporation.”285 By contrast, when 
Congress incorporated the American National Red Cross (Red Cross), it ex-
plicitly noted that the Red Cross is a “[f]ederally chartered instrumentality of 
the United States and a body corporate and politic in the District of Colum-
                                                                                                                           
 277 See Burton v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 574 F. Supp. 517, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (finding that the 
USOPC has nationalized citizenship). 
 278 See id. (stating that USOPC has nationalized citizenship, and thereby does not have “local-
ized” citizenship in any one state). 
 279 See Hansmann, supra note 164, at 600 (observing that state attorneys general typically have 
power to challenge the acts of nonprofit boards of directors). 
 280 See 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 1.2 (providing that the USOPC’s principal office is in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado). 
 281 See 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (stating that the USOPC is a federally chartered corporation); 2018 
FORM 990, supra note 258, at 1 (indicating the legal domicile). In 1954, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia also recognized in United States v. Mount Vernon Mortgage Corp. that the Unit-
ed States, presumably via the U.S. Attorney General, may be the responsible party for pursuing 
breaches of nonprofit directors’ fiduciary duties. 128 F. Supp. 629, 636 (D.D.C. 1954). 
 282 See infra notes 283–287 and accompanying text (refuting the contention that state attorneys 
general are the proper parties to challenge the acts of the USOPC Board). 
 283 36 U.S.C. § 220531(a) (providing the Attorney General authority to make “grant[s] to an eli-
gible nonprofit nongovernmental entity in order to support oversight of the [USOPC], each [NGB], 
and each paralympic sports organization” to protect “amateur athletes against abuse”); OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART FY 2018: KEEP YOUNG ATHLETES SAFE (2018), 
https://smart.gov/pdfs/SMARTFY18KeepSafe.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP96-N5T2] (listing the Depart-
ment of Justice as one of the entities seeking grant applications for approval). 
 284 See 36 U.S.C. § 220531(a). 
 285 Id. § 220502(a). 
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bia.”286 Congress knew how to tie a federally incorporated nonprofit corpora-
tion to a specific state or district, but did not do so with the USOPC.287 
The USOPC is unique in its broad scope, which renders the U.S. Attorney 
General the preferable enforcer and addresses a number of the issues facing 
state attorneys general in pursuing nonprofit breaches.288 As an initial matter, 
the Attorney General advocates on behalf of the United States, and Congress 
explicitly stated that the USOPC is accountable to the United States.289 The 
USOPC’s purposes are equally broad and touch nearly everyone in the United 
States.290 The USOPC must not only “obtain . . . the most competent” athletes 
for the U.S. Olympic Team, but also encourage “public participation in ama-
teur athletic activities.”291 By giving the USOPC a monopoly over Olympic 
sports, Congress required the USOPC to act at all levels of sport.292 The 
USOPC’s mission must track these federally mandated purposes of incorpora-
tion, lest it violate federal law.293 The ideal enforcer to mobilize and enforce 
the fiduciary duties of such a sweeping nonprofit is the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral.294 Additionally, the dual-hat of the USOPC purposes as both positive law 
                                                                                                                           
 286 Id. § 300101(a). 
 287 Compare id. § 220502(a) (providing no state in the USOPC organizing statute), with id. 
§ 300101(a) (listing the District of Columbia in the Red Cross’s organizing statute). 
 288 See id. § 220503 (prescribing fifteen purposes for the USOPC’s incorporation); Phila. Indem. 
Ins. Co. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., No. 19-cv-01231-CMA-KMT, 2020 WL 610798, at *3 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 28, 2020) (noting, in rejecting a diversity jurisdiction claim, that although the USOPC is head-
quartered in Colorado, “its mission and purpose are not only nationwide, but worldwide”); Burton, 
574 F. Supp. at 521 (“Both under the terms of its charter and as a result of its multi-state, if not na-
tionwide activities, the [USOPC] cannot be considered to be ‘localized’ in Colorado.”). 
 289 See S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 5 (1978); About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.
justice.gov/ag/about-office [https://perma.cc/74Y8-UAMS] (last updated July 17, 2018). 
 290 See 36 U.S.C. § 220503. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See id. § 220503(6) (incorporating the USOPC, in part, to “promote and encourage physical 
fitness and public participation in amateur athletic activities”); Koller, supra note 56, at 1044–45 
(noting that “comprehensive amateur sport policy and grassroots sport development has fallen by the 
wayside in favor of elite, high-performance sport” and that the USOPC has narrowed its focus with 
Congress “tacitly” approving). Congress has not, however, changed the purposes laid out in the Ted 
Stevens Act to remove the promotion of amateur athletics and public participation. See 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220503. 
 293 See Solo v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶ 11 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n May 
28, 2019) (Peterson, Albrecht, Witherspoon, Arbs.) (identifying the Ted Stevens Act as a U.S. law). 
 294 See infra notes 304–349 and accompanying text (explaining why the Attorney General should 
investigate potential breaches of fiduciary duty by the USOPC Board). Arguably, another effective 
enforcement mechanism is activating the IRS’s capacity to threaten the USOPC’s § 501(c)(3) status. 
See 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2019); Mayer, supra note 110, at 121. The IRS can challenge the acts 
of nonprofit directors if such acts run afoul of federal tax law. 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). When a nonprofit 
spends resources outside of its incorporated purposes, the IRS could determine that the nonprofit acted 
outside of its exempt purposes. See Fishman, supra note 143, at 239 n.148 (“Since the duty of obedi-
ence requires the directors to uphold the organization’s founding documents, which require the organ-
ization to operate for a charitable purpose, operating for non-exempt purposes would be an ultra vires 
activity.”). The problem with this enforcement mechanism is the ultimate harm will fall on amateur 
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and its incorporated mission statement make cases of “mission creep” less sub-
jective and easier to identify.295 
Even if some of the qualms about attorneys general enforcing nonprofit 
fiduciary law have merit, there is no better alternative in the context of the 
USOPC.296 In some states, members of a nonprofit corporation may bring a 
derivative suit against the board of directors of such nonprofit for breaches of 
fiduciary duties.297 Here, the members are the NGBs.298 The NGBs not only 
rely on the USOPC for their very existence, but also rely on grants from the 
USOPC for revenue.299 For example, the USSA received a $6,089,500 grant 
from the USOPC, pursuant to a “results-driven resource-allocation process.”300 
This represents almost seventeen percent of the USSA’s total revenue for 
2018.301 This is likely a material amount to the USSA, rendering it largely in-
capable of policing USOPC actions.302 Furthermore, athletes cannot directly 
challenge the USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties because they are not members 
of the USOPC.303 
                                                                                                                           
athletes, the very individuals Congress created the USOPC to protect. See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (identi-
fying amateur athletes as primary beneficiaries of the USOPC’s actions). Most amateur athletes al-
ready struggle to fund their Olympic pursuits. Eddie Pells, Survey Finds Olympic, Elite Athletes 
Struggling Financially, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/1918e5dff91a479d9
ab025cc644c29a7 [https://web.archive.org/web/20200817085927/https://apnews.com/1918e5dff91a
479d9ab025cc644c29a7] (finding in a survey that 58% of 500 elite athletes “did not consider them-
selves financially stable”). The USOPC already does not adequately fund most athletes; subjecting it 
to for-profit taxation would only further diminish financial support of athletes. Automatic Revocation 
of Exemption, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.irs.gov/charities-
non-profits/automatic-revocation-of-exemption [https://perma.cc/VT7Q-3QPU] (providing that if a 
nonprofit loses its tax-exempt status, it is subject to federal income tax and cannot receive tax-exempt 
donations). 
 295 See Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Accountability, supra note 152, at 226 (noting that attorneys 
general may be unwilling to challenge “mission creep” if it is against their political interest, implying 
a subjective analysis). 
 296 See infra notes 297–303 and accompanying text (arguing against other enforcement mecha-
nisms). 
 297 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008) (allowing “any director 
or member of a designated body” to bring derivative suits against nonprofit corporation); Mead & 
Pollack, supra note 144, at 297. But see Tran v. Hoang, 481 S.W.3d 313, 316–17 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) 
(citing a Texas statute as support for the conclusion that members lacked standing to derivatively sue a 
nonprofit’s board of directors). 
 298 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 8.3. 
 299 See 36 U.S.C. § 220521(a) (granting USOPC sole power to recognize NGBs); Financial Re-
sources, supra note 255. 
 300 SKI & SNOWBOARD REPORT, supra note 247, at 55; Financial Resources, supra note 255. 
 301 SKI & SNOWBOARD REPORT, supra note 247, at 55. 
 302 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (noting, in a different context, that 
courts will consider directors interested in a transaction when such transaction materially impacts such 
directors’ interests); Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36 (“Of such a nature that 
knowledge of the item would affect a person’s decision-making . . . .”). 
 303 Mitten & Davis, supra note 77, at 92. 
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B. The U.S. Attorney General Should Pursue Breaches of  
the USOPC Board’s Fiduciary Duties 
As there is no federal law of nonprofit corporations, and state nonprofit 
laws vary considerably, the first question facing the U.S. Attorney General is 
which body of law to apply.304 This should not mean that the USOPC Board is 
not bound by fiduciary law.305 Instead, the best solution is to follow the Model 
Act or the Restatement.306 
Both the Model Act and the Restatement, as well as state nonprofit stat-
utes, recognize that members of nonprofit boards of directors have a duty of 
loyalty.307 This duty requires board members to act in the best interests of the 
nonprofit corporation.308 Directors who knowingly violate the law do not act 
loyally towards their nonprofit corporation.309 The Ted Stevens Act serves not 
only as federal law, but also as the equivalent of a typical nonprofit’s articles of 
incorporation for the USOPC.310 Accordingly, any USOPC Board action that 
violates the Ted Stevens Act contravenes U.S. law and the USOPC’s own in-
corporating document.311 Even though the Model Act and the Restatement do 
not acknowledge the duty of obedience by name, the Attorney General should 
also enforce this duty against the USOPC Board.312 
This Note provided three instances in which the USOPC Board breached 
its fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience by acting in violation of federal 
law and its incorporating statute: (1) removing any reference to the AAA; (2) 
narrowing the class of athletes for which the USOPC holds itself responsible; 
and (3) impermissibly allocating funds amongst NGBs.313 The Attorney Gen-
                                                                                                                           
 304 Berman, supra note 115, at 1581–82 (identifying varied state approaches to organizing non-
profit law). 
 305 See Hansmann, supra note 164, at 601 (emphasizing the importance of fiduciary duties and 
standards in nonprofit law). 
 306 See generally MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE 
NONPROFIT ORGS. 
 307 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NON-
PROFIT ORGS. § 2.02(c) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 308 Mayer, supra note 110, at 109. 
 309 Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 491, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 310 See 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (incorporating the USOPC under an act of Congress, listed within 
the federal statute). 
 311 Id. 
 312 See Fishman, supra note 143, at 229–30 (recognizing the duty of obedience); Palmiter, supra 
note 145, at 458 (providing that nonprofit fiduciaries “must abide by the legal restrictions that apply to 
their organizations, such as those imposed by the non-profits constitutive documents”). 
 313 See supra notes 197–263 and accompanying text (describing three acts by the USOPC Board 
implicating their fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience). 
2740 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2695 
eral should challenge these acts because each represents an important congres-
sionally-granted right and violates the duties of loyalty and obedience.314 
First, the USOPC Board-approved 2020 Bylaws remove any reference to 
the AAA.315 The Ted Stevens Act expressly grants parties unsatisfied with a 
USOPC determination regarding athlete rights recourse to the AAA.316 The 
USOPC, by granting itself the right to pick the arbitral association which will 
hear the appeal, violated this law and breached its duty of loyalty.317 Allowing 
the USOPC to pick the arbitral association, and the accompanying rules, puts 
athletes in an untenable position of uncertainty and only increases the asym-
metry of power between athletes and the USOPC.318 
The USOPC Board discussed the “hearing panel and arbitration provi-
sions,” but did not provide any public reasoning for the impermissible substitu-
tion in its Bylaws of the AAA for an arbitral association chosen by the USOPC 
itself.319 It is hard to come up with any justification at all.320 The AAA main-
tains strict qualifications for arbitrators hearing sport related disputes.321 It re-
quires arbitrators to possess extensive sports law knowledge, maintain the ut-
most standards of neutrality and respect for the arbitration process, and sustain 
a good reputation among peers.322 It is a known entity that provides “impartial” 
resolution of athlete disputes, with the capacity to do so on an “expedited” ba-
sis.323 The USOPC Board’s removal of any reference to the AAA was not only 
contrary to law and a violation of its fiduciary duty of loyalty, but also a mys-
                                                                                                                           
 314 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 5.01 cmt. a (noting that 
an attorney general’s standing stems from the office’s role as an agent of the state acting under the 
parens patriae doctrine and in furtherance of the public interest). 
 315 Compare 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (providing that the USOPC may 
designate the arbitral organization for appeals), with 2019 BYLAWS, supra note 85, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 
11.22 (stating that the aggrieved party may appeal to the AAA). 
 316 36 U.S.C. §§ 220522, 220527, 220529. 
 317 See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (noting that directors’ breaking the law is always a disloy-
al action). 
 318 See West v. U.S. Bobsled & Skeleton Fed’n, Inc., Case No. 01-19-0000-4345, ¶ 10.5 (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n Mar. 19, 2019) (Myler, Arb.) (noting in a different context the importance of clarity 
in providing guidance to athletes). The AAA is a known entity, and as stated by a USOPC hearing 
board itself, has the capacity to ensure a “fair and impartial process.” Solo Dismissal, supra note 205, 
¶ 43. 
 319 U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., MINUTES: USOPC BOARD OF DIRECTORS TELEPHONIC 
MEETING (Nov. 7 2019), https://www.teamusa.org/About-the-USOPC/Meetings/Board-of-Directors/
2019 [https://perma.cc/XC7N-J59M]. 
 320 See infra notes 321–324 and accompanying text (describing benefits of the AAA as the desig-
nated arbitral organization). 
 321 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR MEMBERS OF THE AAA NATIONAL 
SPORTS PANEL 1, http://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Neutrals_Sports_Panel_Qualifications.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/54PJ-Q5WS]. 
 322 Id. at 1–2. 
 323 Mitten & Davis, supra note 77, at 97. 
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terious rejection of a well-regarded and efficient dispute resolution organiza-
tion.324 
The USOPC’s gift of the power to select an arbitral association to itself 
compounds the folly of such removal.325 The Ted Stevens Act tasks the 
USOPC with providing swift resolutions of disputes.326 With the AAA as the 
default, aggrieved parties could begin preparations for potential disputes in 
advance.327 Now, an aggrieved party is faced with impermissible ambiguity 
and apparently must wait for the USOPC to decide which arbitral association it 
desires.328 Again, this is not just a violation of the Ted Stevens Act, but also an 
ipso facto breach of the USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties and bad policy.329 
Second, the USOPC Board impermissibly restricted the scope of its mis-
sion statement by referencing “Team USA athletes,” and not the broader cate-
gory of amateur athletes as mandated by the Ted Stevens Act.330 The USOPC 
has a total monopoly over organizing and overseeing Olympic sports in the 
                                                                                                                           
 324 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8) (requiring the USOPC to “provide swift resolution of conflicts” con-
cerning an amateur athlete’s “opportunity . . . to participate”). Compare 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, 
§§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (granting the USOPC authority to designate the arbitral association), with 2019 
BYLAWS, supra note 85, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22 (providing the AAA as the venue for dispute resolution). 
Adding to the confusion, USOPC Bylaws Section 9.7 allows for athletes to simultaneously file their 
complaints with the arbitral organization and the USOPC in time sensitive situations. 2020 BYLAWS, 
supra note 19, § 9.7. Under the current regime, however, it is impossible for an athlete to simultane-
ously file with an arbitral association and the USOPC because the USOPC must first designate the 
arbitral association. See id. This obfuscation neglects athlete’s rights in contravention of the Ted Ste-
vens Act. See 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8) (tasking the USOPC with protecting an athlete’s opportunity to 
compete). 
 325 See 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 11.22. 
 326 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8); see Hyatt v. U.S. Judo, Inc., Case No. 01-14-0000-7635, at 2 (Am. Arbi-
tration Ass’n June 27, 2014) (Mitten, Arb.) (stating that disputes involving the opportunity to compete in 
protected competitions are “required to be resolved by final and binding arbitration in accordance with 
the Commercial Rules of the AAA” (citing 36 U.S.C. §§ 220509(a), 220522(a)(4)(B)). 
 327 The AAA Sports Arbitration Practice, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://go.adr.org/sports-dispute-
resolution.html [https://perma.cc/9FVW-UMPG] (providing information on the AAA’s resolution of 
disputes concerning provisions of the Ted Stevens Act, as well as contact information and a form for 
submitting questions). 
 328 See Tubbs v. USA Taekwondo, Case No. 01-15-0004-7133, ¶ 27 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n Sept. 
10, 2015) (Campbell, Arb.) (quoting USA Shooting v. Quigley, CAS 94/129, ¶ 2) (Ct. Arbitration 
Sport May 23, 1995) (“Athletes and officials should not be confronted with a thicket of mutually qual-
ifying or even contradictory rules that can be understood only on the basis of the defacto practice over 
the course of many years of small group of insiders.”); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, §§ 9.7, 10.21, 
11.22. 
 329 See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (stating that “one cannot act loyally as a corporate director 
by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey”). 
 330 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.1 (referencing “Team USA athletes” in an updated mission 
statement); Fishman, supra note 143, at 230 (defining the duty of obedience as “requiring compliance 
with the expressed purposes of the organization”); Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization, supra note 
146, at 900 (identifying a “narrow approach to the duty of obedience” and tying the duty of obedience 
“to the purposes in the corporation’s internal documents, and that actions beyond those purposes are 
not within the corporate powers”). 
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United States, which includes qualifying events for the Olympics.331 By target-
ing “Team USA athletes,” a subgroup that does not have written qualifying 
criteria, the USOPC Board ignores the majority of the amateur athletes Con-
gress tasked it with protecting.332 The net-effect of this decision is a violation 
of the USOPC Board’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience.333 
The U.S. Attorney General should swiftly address and correct any at-
tempted narrowing of the athletes that Congress tasked the USOPC with pro-
tecting.334 The USOPC distances itself from any systemic abuse and violations 
of the Ted Stevens Act at the NGB level by narrowing the scope of athletes it 
prioritizes and protects.335 
                                                                                                                           
 331 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3)–(4) (granting the USOPC “exclusive jurisdiction” over all matters 
relating to United States participation in the Olympics and requiring the USOPC to provide the “most 
competent representation” at such events). 
 332 Compare 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (listing fifteen different purposes, none of them referencing 
“Team USA athletes”), with 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.1 (stating the USOPC’s mission is to 
“empower Team USA athletes to achieve sustained competitive excellence and well-being’). Notably, 
many of the gymnasts sexually abused by Larry Nassar in his role as the USA Gymnastics’ team doc-
tor likely would not have been “Team USA” athletes at the time of the abuse, and the first woman to 
come forward is not listed as a “Team USA” athlete on the USOPC website. Athletes, supra note 244 
(cataloguing “Team USA” athletes, but not including Rachael Joy Denhollander, the first woman to 
publicly come forward about Larry Nassar’s abuse); Louise Radnofsky, Nassar Victims Move to 
Throw Out USA Gymnastics’ Bankruptcy Bid, WALL STREET J., (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/nassar-victims-move-to-throw-out-usa-gymnastics-bankruptcy-bid-11579698001 [https://
perma.cc/W66N-GRKZ] (stating that many victims were abused as teenagers at meets and training 
camps). 
 333 See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (noting that boards cannot act loyally while violating the 
law); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02(c) (identifying, as part 
of the duty of loyalty, the requirement under the “doctrine of cy pres” that a board seek judicial per-
mission before altering its charitable purpose (emphasis added)); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.1 
(referencing “Team USA athletes” in an updated mission statement). 
 334 See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (addressing, repeatedly, amateur athletes as a target of the USOPC’s 
actions); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 2.1 (targeting “Team USA athletes” in an updated mission 
statement). 
 335 See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (directing the USOPC to protect amateur athletes throughout the sec-
tion delineating USOPC purposes); see also id. § 220542 (identifying duty of U.S. Center for Safe 
Sport to implement measures to protect amateur athletes from abuse). Some members of Congress 
proposed legislation that would enforce a duty of care on behalf of the USOPC Board to ensure com-
pliance with safe sport policies. S. 2330, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019) (creating a duty of care to, among 
other related acts, “ensure that each national governing body and paralympic sports organization com-
plies with the oversight practices, policies, and procedures” of the U.S. Center for Safe Sport). The 
legislation would additionally allow a complete dissolution of the USOPC Board in the event Con-
gress determines that the USOPC violated this proposed duty of care. S. 2330 § 4. Completely dis-
solving the USOPC Board, much less placing this power in the hands of Congress, does not cut to the 
heart of the issue and could result in chaos. See id. (allowing joint resolution of Congress and Senate 
to dissolve the USOPC Board if it fails to abide by the Ted Stevens Act). This dissolution would put 
the U.S. Olympic Movement in the very disjointed position that Congress passed the Ted Stevens Act 
to remedy. See S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 3 (describing the impetus of 1978 amendments remedying the 
“disorganization” of Olympic sports in the United States and “resolv[ing] the serious factional dis-
putes that were its result”). 
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Finally, the USOPC Board continues to violate its duties of loyalty and 
obedience by providing grants to NGBs based on a vaguely-worded “results-
driven resource-allocation process.”336 Nowhere does the Ted Stevens Act ref-
erence results; it requires only that the USOPC obtain the “most competent 
representation in each event.”337 Despite this absence of results language in the 
Ted Stevens Act, and as Part Two Section D discusses, in 2011 the USOPC 
promulgated a hierarchy of funding and divided NGBs into three groups based 
on probability of medal success.338 This allocation bears little, if any, resem-
blance to equally supporting NGBs and ensuring “competent amateur repre-
sentation possible in each event.”339 The discrepancy in grant amounts contra-
venes the Ted Stevens Act’s requirement that the USOPC enable competent 
representation in every Olympic and Paralympic event.340 Therefore, the fund-
ing strategy violates the USOPC Board’s duties of loyalty and obedience.341 
Additional breaches of duty likely exist.342 For example, the USOPC 
Form 990 indicates that the CEO and members of the USOPC Board may 
bring their spouses with them to Olympic events.343 How, and whether, this 
expenditure furthers the USOPC’s incorporated purpose is debatable.344 There 
also may be breaches of duty where the USOPC fails to properly oversee NGB 
                                                                                                                           
 336 See Financial Resources, supra note 255 (providing the standard for resource distribution). A 
board violates its duty of obedience if it fails to act in furtherance of the purpose of the corporation, 
which may also implicate a board of directors’ duty of loyalty not to act ultra vires. Sugin, Resisting 
the Corporatization, supra note 146, at 899  (“A director is charged with carrying out the purposes of 
the organization, as expressed in the legal documents creating and defining its mission. . . . 
[D]iversion[] of corporate resources to other goals, no matter how laudable, [is] not legally justifia-
ble.” (quoting DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 85 (1998))). 
 337 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4). Despite the absence of money or medals mentioned anywhere in the 
Ted Stevens Act, an unnamed USOPC executive remarked that “‘money and medals’ were probably 
uttered at every staff meeting . . . with the effect of marginalizing other topics such as athlete pro-
gramming.” See DOWDEN & MCPHEE, supra note 6, at 144. 
 338 See supra notes 256–257 and accompanying text (providing more detail on the USOPC’s 
grant allocation to NGBs). 
 339 See 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (requiring the USOPC to support and ensure proficient representa-
tion in each Olympic and Paralympic event); Mickle, supra note 256 (explaining disparate funding for 
NGBs). 
 340 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4). 
 341 See Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization, supra note 146, at 899 (noting that spending assets 
not in furtherance of nonprofit purposes is indefensible). 
 342 See infra notes 343–349 and accompanying text (discussing further acts by the USOPC Board 
which may constitute breaches of fiduciary duties). 
 343 2018 FORM 990, supra note 258, at 53 (noting “[t]he [USOPC] determined that it is sometimes 
beneficial for the CEO and Board Members to have their spouses accompany them to particular 
events, such as the Olympic Games. In such cases those expenses can be paid by the [USOPC]”). The 
USOPC’s Form 990 also reveals that the USOPC CEO may fly first class domestically or business 
class internationally, at his or her discretion. Id. 
 344 See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (listing the USOPC’s purposes). 
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compliance with the Ted Stevens Act.345 For example, arbitrators make clear 
that the Ted Stevens Act requires the USOPC to protect not only the opportuni-
ty to participate in the actual Olympic Games themselves, but also qualifying 
competitions for the Olympics and naming to national teams.346 Accordingly, 
when an NGB promulgates national team criteria that violates provisions of the 
Ted Stevens Act, the USOPC, by approving such criteria, breaches its duty of 
oversight.347 For example, the USSA’s criteria for selection to its national team 
admittedly applies different criteria for different ages, requiring older athletes 
to have a better world ranking than younger athletes.348 This is a clear violation 
                                                                                                                           
 345 See, e.g., Solo, Case No. 01-18-003-1976, ¶¶ 17–18 (noting USSF dispute resolution stood 
“alone next to most, if not all, other NGBs that currently comply with the [USOPC] bylaws”); see also 
2021 U.S. Cross Country Team Nomination Criteria, U.S. SKI & SNOWBOARD ASS’N (Sept. 2019), 
https://usskiandsnowboard.org/sport-programs/criteria/us-cross-country-team-criteria [https://perma.
cc/2UD8-VZWX] [hereinafter Cross Country Criteria] (providing that when filling discretionary 
spots the USSA staff “may consider” the “[c]ompletion of individual markers” and that “[a]thletes 
who have been given individual performance criteria to meet will be subject to those specific criteria 
and not to general criteria as outlined below”). USSA’s criteria excludes from the general qualifica-
tion requirements individual athletes for whom an unidentified authority establishes “individual per-
formance criteria.” Id. This runs directly contrary to arbitrators’ assertions that discretionary selection 
be primarily “objectively based,” the USOPC Bylaw’s requirement of a “clear” selection procedure as 
approved by itself, and the Ted Stevens Act, which demands that selection procedures provide “an 
equal opportunity . . . to participate.” See 36 U.S.C. § 220522(8) (providing equal opportunity); 
McConneloug v. USA Cycling, Case No. 30-190-00750-04, ¶ 25 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n July 20, 
2004) (Rivkin, Arb.) (stating that NGBs “have the responsibility to athletes and others to make the 
rules clear, transparent, and easy to apply without confusion”); 2020 BYLAWS, supra note 19, 
§ 8.7.1(d) (requiring NGBs to establish “clear” selection procedures). The USOPC approved these 
qualification criteria, despite their blatant violation of three independent sources of law. See 2020 
BYLAWS, supra note 19, § 8.7.1(d) (providing that the USOPC must approve any promulgated selec-
tion criteria). 
 346 Vinogradova v. U.S. Biathlon Ass’n, Case No. 77-0190-00511-09, ¶ 2.1 (Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n Feb. 16, 2010) (Benz, Arb.) (standing for the proposition that selection to a national team is an 
opportunity to compete protected by the Ted Stevens Act, and that a dispute regarding national team 
selection is a controversy involving the opportunity of an athlete to participate within the meaning of 
§ 220522(a)(4) of the Ted Stevens Act over which an AAA arbitrator has jurisdiction). 
 347 See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (providing that a director that causes the corporation to 
violate the law is a disloyal director); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971–
72 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting the potential for a breach of fiduciary duty when directors fail to oversee 
an implemented reporting system). 
 348 See Cross Country Criteria, supra note 345 (providing different world rank levels for meeting 
objective criteria based on the age of an amateur athlete). The introduction to the criteria states: “An-
other change you’ll see is the inclusion of age-weighted criteria. This takes some of the guesswork out 
of deciding who is in a position to succeed at the World Cup level right now vs. younger athletes with 
strong potential.” Id. A cross-country skiing news outlet, Fasterskier, recently interviewed U.S. Cross 
Country Ski Team head coach Matt Witcomb about 2020–2021 team selection. Nordic Nation: U.S. 
Ski Team Head Coach Matt Witcomb Fields Questions from Left and Right Field, FASTERSKIER (May 
1, 2020), https://fasterskier.com/2020/05/nordic-nation-u-s-ski-team-head-coach-matt-whitcomb-
fields-questions-from-right-and-left-field/ [https://perma.cc/4ZSN-GDAG] [hereinafter Witcomb 
Fields Questions]. The interview discussed an athlete not named to the national team despite consist-
ently beating all other male cross-country skiers in the United States in distance races. Id. The athlete 
missed the objective criteria. Id. He was ranked forty-third in the world but the objective criteria re-
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of the prohibition on age discrimination in 36 U.S.C. § 220522(8), and ap-
proved by the USOPC in violation of its fiduciary duties.349 
CONCLUSION 
Congress gave the USOPC a complete monopoly over Olympic and ama-
teur sports in the United States, without providing equally robust accountabil-
ity and enforcement mechanisms. As such, the USOPC Board has had a virtu-
ally unfettered ability to make changes to its Bylaws, structure, and activities 
without consequence. The USOPC Board, the entity tasked with managing and 
directing the acts of a federally incorporated nonprofit corporation, must rec-
ognize its fiduciary duties and face consequences when it breaches them. This 
Note highlights three acts of the USOPC Board implicating, and likely violat-
ing, their fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience. The U.S. Attorney General 
is the proper party to enforce these duties and should promptly do so. The law 
only works when the decision-makers follow the law. The USOPC Board’s 
decisions and accompanying fiduciary breaches harm athletes, the very group 
of individuals Congress incorporated the USOPC to protect. 
ANNE HART 
                                                                                                                           
quired a ranking of fortieth in the world. Id. The team did not use its discretionary power to name him, 
but did use its discretionary power to name a different male distance athlete. Id. The following ex-
change occurred during a discussion of age-based criteria: 
FasterSkier: The messaging, it sounds like the point is medal potential rather than hav-
ing your best distance skier represented on the team. 
Witcomb: That’s right, I think that’s right . . . [he] is two years behind the curve. If he 
was twenty-seven and having the same results [the criteria] would capture him. And, so, 
the message is simply get on it. 
Id. Section 220522(a)(8) of the Ted Stevens Act explicitly requires an NGB to grant amateur athletes 
“an equal opportunity to participate . . . without discrimination on the basis of . . . age.” 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220522(a)(8). It is nearly impossible to come up with a more flagrant statement and manifest ac-
ceptance of age discrimination than “[i]f [he] was twenty-seven and having the same results [the crite-
ria] would capture him.” See Witcomb Fields Questions, supra note 348 (emphasis added). The head 
coach affirmed, and the USOPC approved, a set of criteria denying a thirty-year-old athlete team nom-
ination because of his age. Id. By approving this criteria the USOPC breached its fiduciary duties. See 
36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(8) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age). In addition, Witcomb’s 
confirmation that “the point is medal potential rather than having your best distance skier represented 
on the team” is patently contrary to the Ted Stevens Act’s mandate that the USOPC assure that the 
United States is represented by “the most competent amateur representation possible.” See id. 
§ 220503(4); Witcomb Fields Questions, supra note 348. The medal potential in a future protected 
competition has no place in criteria for selection to the instant protected competition. See 36 U.S.C. 
§ 220503(4). 
 349 See 36 U.S.C. § 220522(8); Yun v. USA Taekwondo, Inc., Case No. 01-15-0005-7406, ¶ 87 
(Am. Arbitration Ass’n Jan. 7, 2016) (Oliveau, Arb.) (suggesting that where qualification criteria 
restricts athletes of a certain age “per se” and “exclusively impact[s]” those athletes, such criteria may 
contravene the requirements of the Ted Stevens Act). 
